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LEARNING FROM NEPA: 
GUIDELINES FOR RESPONSIBLE RISK LEGISLATION†
Celia Campbell-Mohn∗ 
John S. Applegate∗∗
I. Introduction 
The current debate over the use of quantitative risk assessment in 
health, safety, and environmental protection legislation breaks down, 
broadly speaking, into three points of view. One view regards risk as-
sessment with great skepticism and in some cases outright rejection.1 In-
dividuals subscribing to this perspective believe that risk assessment 
merely justifies industry and others in harming the public and the envi-
ronment; it legitimates the status quo that regulation should improve.2 
This view is typically associated with the environmental movement. Op-
posing thinkers view risk assessment as the foundation of rational regula-
tion. Without structured, scientifically based, and quantitative informa-
tion, federal agencies cannot hope to make sensible regulatory decisions.3 
 
                                                                                                                            
† This Article is based on a report by the authors to support a set of draft guidelines 
for risk legislation, which the Rulemaking Committee of the Section on Administrative 
Law and Regulatory Practice was to propose for adoption by the American Bar Associa-
tion. While the report explained the thinking behind the original draft guidelines, it (and 
hence this article) is not an official product of the Committee or Section. At the October 
1998 meeting of the Section’s leadership, the guidelines suggested herein were strongly 
opposed for being unduly skeptical about risk assessment by several Section members who 
represent industry and the Republican majority of the Congressional committees working 
on risk legislation. As a result, the Section deferred its decision on these guidelines, and 
the Section is now considering revised guidelines. 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. 
∗∗ Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law–Bloomington. 
1. An activist friend calls risk “a four-letter word.” 
2. Examples of risk-assessment skeptics include Robert R. Kuehn, The Environ-
mental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 103; John 
Atcheson, The Department of Risk Reduction or Risky Business, 21 Envtl. L. 1375 (1991); 
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Compara-
tive Risk Analysis, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 562 (1992) [hereinafter Hornstein, Reclaiming Envi-
ronmental Law]; see also Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk 
Assessment, 19 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 409 (1995). 
A good spectrum of views can be found in an issue of the EPA Journal devoted to 
this subject, Setting Environmental Priorities, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1991, at 18. 
3. This view is described and sources cited in Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion 
on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Cir-
cle, 3 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 295, 298–305 (1995) (describing the “science-policy landscape”) 
[hereinafter Finkel, A Second Opinion]. Finkel himself is a pragmatist, as shown below. 
Examples of this view include John D. Graham, The Risk Not Reduced, 3 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 382 (1995) and Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, “More Good than 
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While some proponents of the increased use of risk assessment in regula-
tion have declared the inevitable expense and delay of formal analytical 
requirements to be a positive benefit of such legislation—slow govern-
ment action usually reduces regulatory burdens4—the majority presuma-
bly regard expense and delay as the unfortunate but unavoidable price of 
good regulation. Industry tends to support the expanded use of risk as-
sessment. 
Between these contending positions lies a more pragmatic point of 
view that encompasses an even greater spectrum of views than the two 
poles. The pragmatic approach sees real value in risk assessment, par-
ticularly as a way to organize relevant information, but it recognizes the 
serious limitations raised by its critics. The most important limitations 
are our limited understanding of many of the physical processes that give 
rise to risk (especially, but not only, toxic risk), the lack of adequate and 
reliable data, and the incompleteness of quantified risk as a description 
of the harms which regulation seeks to address.5 These difficulties are by 
no means fatal defects, but they counsel humility and caution in using 
risk assessment.6 The limitations also suggest the utility of public in-
volvement in at least some parts of the risk assessment process. This 
pragmatic approach appears in the major National Academy of Sciences 
(“NAS”) studies7 of risk assessment and in the recent report of the Presi-
dential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Man-
agement.8
This Article also draws on nearly thirty years of experience with the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) to advocate the adoption 
of a pragmatic approach to risk assessment. 
 
                                                                                                                            
Harm”: A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 Ecology 
L.Q. 379 (1993). 
4. See Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 99 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 1999); Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA’s Critics and 
Regulatory Reform, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 587, 611–22 (1996) (expressing the concern 
that regulatory “improvement” was not the only motivation with Occupational Safety and 
Health Act). 
5. For excellent summaries of the costs and benefits of risk assessment, see 
McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 4; Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 Admin. 
L. Rev. 7, 16–33 (1998). 
6. In the pithy phrase of one experienced observer, risk assessment is “not ready for 
prime time.” McGarity, supra note 5, at 32. 
7. National Research Council, Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment 
of Risks to Public Health, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (1983) [hereinafter Red Book]; National Research Council, Understanding Risk: 
Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (1996) [hereinafter Understanding Risk]; 
National Research Council, Committee on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 
Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (1994) [hereinafter Science and Judgment in 
Risk Assessment]; National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication (1989). 
8. Presidential/Congressional Comm’n on Risk Assessment and Management, Risk 
Assessment and Risk Management in Regulatory Decision-Making (1997) [hereinafter 
Presidential/Congressional Comm’n]. 
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The pragmatic approach, because it focuses on the limitations of the 
risk assessment methodology, urges extra caution when approaching leg-
islation that would mandate the use of risk assessment for a broad range 
of administrative actions. Three particularly important concerns appear 
throughout this Article. First, legislative requirements must be flexible 
enough to account for the wide variety of federal regulation (traffic acci-
dents, radiation leaks, ditch cave-ins, habitat protection, and toxic air 
emissions), for the varying levels of availability and reliability of under-
lying data, and for developments in risk assessment methodology itself. 
Second, since these requirements inevitably entail a greater investment of 
government time and money to carry out protective legislation, they 
should be carefully framed to assure that the expense and delay do not 
overwhelm the value they add to the regulatory process. Third, any new 
procedural mandate will result in judicial review, and care must be taken 
to maintain an appropriate relationship between courts and agencies. 
NEPA has much to teach in all three of these areas. 
Part II of the Article begins with an overview of the role of risk as-
sessment in agency decisionmaking. It discusses in more detail the range 
of views within the pragmatic position, that is, on the one hand the limi-
tations of risk assessment, and on the other the changes that would make 
it suitable for wider use. Existing risk reform legislation is described in 
this context. Part III enumerates eight general guidelines for risk assess-
ment legislation, together with an explanation of their function and pur-
pose. These eight guidelines are summarized in Appendix I. Part IV pro-
poses a model risk assessment procedure. It follows generally the NEPA 
environmental impact assessment (“EIA”) process and draws on NEPA 
experience to inform risk legislation. 
II. Risk Assessment and Agency Decisionmaking: An Overview 
Risk assessment has become ubiquitous in the federal government’s 
regulation of a wide variety of threats to safety, health, and the quality of 
our environment. Risk assessment is a process for calculating the prob-
ability and magnitude of identified adverse effects, most commonly ex-
cess deaths from cancer caused by exposure to a chemical or radiological 
agent. The process is used to identify activities that require regulatory 
attention, to select the nature and stringency of an appropriate regulatory 
response, and to choose among the many potential objects of regulators’ 
efforts. Risk assessment aims to “organize and express what can be stated 
about risks that are not subject to direct observation and measurement”9 
based on an analysis of data concerning toxicity and exposure. 
 
                                                                                                                            
9. Joseph V. Rodricks et al., Significant Risk Decisions in Federal Regulatory Agen-
cies, 7 Regulatory Toxicology & Pharmacology 307, 307 (1987); see also National Oil and 
96 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 23 
A 1983 NAS report, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: 
Managing the Process (the “Red Book”) set out the general methodology 
for human-health-related risk assessment.10 The basic calculation is sim-
ple: risk is the product of the toxicity of the hazardous agent and the ex-
posure to it. In the Red Book formulation, quantitative risk assessment 
has four steps. First, hazard identification determines whether a sub-
stance poses a hazard at all, without measuring in detail its potency or 
likely effects. Second, dose-response modeling predicts from testing data 
the toxic effect of a given amount of exposure to a given agent. This 
phase uses the familiar (and often maligned) large-scale animal bioassays 
to reach estimates of toxic potency. To predict dose-response at low lev-
els over long periods, however, the risk assessor must often rely on theo-
retical models. Choosing among these models can be controversial be-
cause the biological mechanisms of toxicity are poorly understood. 
The third step, exposure assessment, undertakes to estimate the 
amount of the agent with which humans or elements of the environment 
are likely to come in contact. A risk assessor is often confronted with 
many routes between the hazardous substance and the human or ecologi-
cal receptor, and extrapolating from exposure to actual dose involves 
more modeling of human and animal metabolism. The differing routes of 
exposure (ingestion, inhalation, or absorption) and metabolism yield an 
additional layer of complexity.11 In addition, to assess the effects of regu-
latory action, the risk assessor must often predict future physical condi-
tions and human behaviors. 
Fourth, risk characterization combines the hazard and exposure 
data, and identifies the assumptions and uncertainties within the data. In 
the classic version, this process is a quantitative exercise: numerical val-
ues are attached to dose-response and exposure, they are multiplied, and 
a risk figure—usually expressed as an individual risk (for example, 1 in 
1,000,000)—is generated.12 The result is a quantitative evaluation that 
 
                                                                                                                            
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8709 (1990) (not-
ing that “the purpose of risk assessment in the Superfund program is to provide a frame-
work for developing risk information necessary to assist decisionmaking at remedial sites. 
Risk assessment provides a consistent process for evaluating and documenting threats to 
human health and the environment posed by hazardous material at sites.”) (codified at 400 
C.F.R. pt. 300 (1998)). 
10. Red Book, supra note 7. Recent authoritative statements of risk assessment 
methodology include Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment, supra note 7; Presiden-
tial/Congressional Comm’n, supra note 8. For excellent discussions of the basis for toxico-
logical risk assessment, see Joseph V. Rodricks, Calculated Risks (1992), and John Harte 
et al., Toxics A to Z 15–43 (1991). The methodologies described in these works were pri-
marily designed to fit the mechanisms of and testing methods for human cancer. 
11. Radiation, for example, has radically different effects depending on the route of 
exposure. Alpha particles are effectively resisted by the skin (dermal exposure), but deadly 
in the lung (inhalation). Harte et al., supra note 10, at 144–45. 
12. Narrative or qualitative risk assessment is necessary for some types of risk. 
Therefore, the recommendation uses the generic term “risk assessment.” 
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represents the excess deaths or illnesses expected from exposure to the 
toxic substances. 
The foregoing steps comprise risk assessment. The Red Book dis-
tinguished this process from risk management, the substantive decision 
to take or withhold regulatory action. The latter, unlike risk assessment, 
explicitly involves political, social, and economic policy questions, such 
as the acceptable level of risk and the appropriate regulatory response.13 
As a rigid dichotomy, of course, this split is an unrealistic view of gov-
ernment action and of science. Political and judgmental factors pervade 
the entire assessment function. Operating in a world of uncertainty, in-
complete data, and genuine differences between scientists in interpreta-
tion of and inferences from the available data, risk assessors must make 
many assumptions and estimates. The choice, for example, among con-
servative, risk-preferring, or middle-ground assumptions is clearly a pol-
icy question.14 Rather than paper over the role of policy in risk assess-
ment, the relationship between risk assessment and risk management 
should be acknowledged: 
A more subtle and less widely recognized impediment to good deci-
sionmaking on risk arises from a rigid adherence to the principle of 
separating risk assessment from risk management. The call to keep 
these two functions distinct was originally articulated in response to 
a widespread perception that EPA was making judgments on the 
risk posed by a particular substance not on the basis of science, but 
rather on the basis of its willingness to regulate the substance. The 
purpose of separation, however, was not to prevent any exercise of 
policy judgment at all when evaluating science or to prevent risk 
managers from influencing the type of information that assessors 
would collect, analyze, or present. Indeed, the Red Book made it 
clear that judgment (also referred to as risk-assessment policy or 
science policy) would be required even during the phase of risk as-
sessment. The present committee concludes further that the science-
policy judgments that EPA makes in the course of risk assessment 
would be improved if they were more clearly informed by the 
 
                                                                                                                            
13. See William Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10,190 (1984); William D. Ruckelshaus, Science, Risk, and Public Policy, 221 Sci-
ence 1026, 1027–28 (1983). 
14. See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 
Yale J. on Reg. 89 (1988); David Doniger, The Gospel of Risk Management: Should We Be 
Converted?, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,222 (1984); see also Thomas O. 
McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science 
Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 Geo. L.J. 729, 736–40 
(1979) (defining science policy questions); Bernard D. Goldstein, Risk Assessment and the 
Interface Between Science and Law, 14 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 343, 349–53 (1989) (suggest-
ing that risk assessment be seen as a three-step process, the first being “science policy” to 
establish assumptions and degree of conservatism). 
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agency’s priorities and goals in risk management. Protecting the in-
tegrity of the risk assessment, while building more productive link-
ages to make risk assessment more accurate and relevant to risk 
management, will be essential as the agency proceeds to regulate 
the residual risks of hazardous air pollutants.15
The Red Book’s distinction can be a useful guide for many purposes, as 
it separates the analytic input into decisions from the substantive deci-
sions themselves and discloses the location of policy judgements through-
out the assessment-management process. 
A risk-assessment requirement would in this sense be analogous to 
the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) process in the NEPA, which 
mandates no particular substantive result, because the EIS informs but is 
clearly distinct from the final agency decision.16 Both risk assessment 
and NEPA reflect the often-difficult intersection of law and science. 
While the two cannot be separated, it is critical to understand when the 
law or science is operating to form policy. 
A. The Risk Assessment Controversy 
The use of risk assessment in environmental decisionmaking has 
been controversial.17 It is impossible in a few pages to summarize fairly, 
or even to cover competently, the subject of countless books, articles, 
commissions, organizations, reports, and journals. At the risk of carica-
ture, however, the contending views (usually expressed by environmental 
and economic development advocates, respectively18) are described be-
low to place the issues in their proper context.19
 
                                                                                                                            
15. Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment, supra note 7, at 259–60. 
16. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348–53 (1989) 
(interpreting NEPA). But see Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of 
the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 203 (1998); Paul S. 
Weiland, Amending the National Environmental Policy Act: Federal Environmental Pro-
tection in the Twenty-First Century, 12 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 275 (1997). 
17. See supra note 3. 
18. There is overlap between these categories as well as the respective criticisms of 
risk assessment. 
19. Other summaries of the contending views can be found in McGarity, A Cost-
Benefit State, supra note 5, at 16–32; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing 
the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 43–75 (1995); and John S. Applegate, A Begin-
ning and Not an End in Itself: The Role of Risk Assessment in Environmental Decision-
Making, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1643, 1657–65 (1995) [hereinafter Applegate, A Beginning and 
Not an End]. 
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1. The Limitations of Risk Assessment 
Opponents of risk-assessment requirements believe that quantified 
risk imperfectly expresses the degree of concern that should attach to a 
particular problem because risk has many meanings that must be disag-
gregated.20 Most toxic risk assessments focus on one outcome (death) of 
one type of disease (cancer) in one species (humans). However, even 
within the purview of human health, there are many possible endpoints: 
teratogenicity (birth defects), non-cancer deaths, cancer that does not 
cause death, neurological damage, breathing difficulty, ad infinitum.21 To 
the extent that workers voluntarily encounter such risks in return for 
payment, occupationally encountered risks are different from other 
risks.22
Furthermore, people may be more risk averse than risk neutral. One 
would certainly infer this point from the legal standards contained in en-
vironmental and health statutes.23 The general public has a strong ten-
dency to focus more on the severity of the possible consequence than the 
relative likelihood of its occurrence, and this approach may not be irra-
tional given the many qualitative differences between individual adverse 
effects and a catastrophe.24 Choices about risk reflect legitimate political 
responses to consistent human patterns of response to risk. Risk assess-
ment or comparison should inform, not erase, those patterns. 
The use of a numerical risk assessment is itself a policy choice that 
can overshadow important social and political considerations. Risk as-
sessment has a distinct technical and political allure to regulators and to 
industry because it offers an apparently scientific justification for regula-
tory action (or inaction) that considers other dangers and (through cost-
 
                                                                                                                            
20. See Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law, supra note 2, at 587–92 (dem-
onstrating that because individuals confront risks in different ways, there is a need for 
theoretical guidance); Clayton P. Gillette & James A. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 
138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1027, 1070–99 (1990); Lisa Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory Re-
form, 8 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 459 (1997). 
21. See California Comparative Risk Project, Toward the 21st Century: Planning for 
the Protection of California’s Environment 14 (1994); Jonathan Lash, Should We Set Pri-
orities Based in Risk Analysis?, EPA J. Mar./Apr. 1991, at 19. 
22. Obviously, there is a spectrum of voluntariness from clearly willing and know-
ing acceptance of risks (astronauts, oil-well fire fighters) to persons who have little choice 
but to accept a job and who understand little of its risks. See John S. Applegate & Steven 
M. Wesloh, Short Changing Short-Term Risk: A Study of Superfund Remedy Selection, 15 
Yale J. on Reg. 269, 307–09 (1998) (discussing the difficulties of comparing occupational 
and non-occupational risks). 
23. See Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law, supra note 2, at 592–604 (not-
ing that by emphasizing aggregate risk, comparative risk assessment ignores distribution of 
risks and specially affected subpopulations). 
24. For example, John Wargo criticizes the consideration of exposure levels (and 
economic benefits) in pesticide regulation because it “permit[s] continued use of pesticides 
that are declared by EPA to be carcinogens.” John Wargo, Our Children’s Toxic Legacy 
272–73, 303 (1996). 
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benefit analysis) the benefits of a particular activity.25 Quantification can 
also compound inaccuracies when information is scarce and judgment 
must fill the gaps.26 Given these uncertainties, the use of numbers may 
imply an unjustified accuracy.27 Quantification may distract attention 
from the underlying value choices and obscure fundamental changes that 
might avoid the risk-benefit trade-offs altogether.28
Risk assessments are information-intensive exercises. They not only 
require information that is frequently unavailable, but they also consume 
scarce agency time and resources.29 A required risk-assessment process 
will (and may be intended to) slow an already burdensome process for 
enacting environmental protections.30 The basic data needed to perform 
risk evaluations of chemicals, activities, and sites are severely limited, 
and the uncertainties in the extant data are profound.31 Moreover, many 
of the required data are in the hands of the regulated entities whose in-
centives for full disclosure and aggressive pursuit of new information are 
limited.32 Risk-assessment requirements, therefore, commit the federal 
 
                                                                                                                            
25. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regula-
tory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 261, 277–84 (1991) (de-
scribing reasons for the adoption of risk assessment) [hereinafter Applegate, Unreasonable 
Risk]; Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law, supra note 2, at 565–84 (describing the 
“allure” of science, rationality, and synoptic analytical techniques). 
26. Environmental Protection Agency, Unfinished Business: A Comparative As-
sessment of Environmental Problems 2–4 (1987) [hereinafter Unfinished Business]; Sci-
ence and Judgment in Risk Assessment, supra note 7, at 80–84. 
27. See Frank P. Grad, Risk Assessment and the Tyranny of Numbers, 1 J. Envtl. L. 
& Litig. 1 (1986). 
28. See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the 
Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 369 (1993) 
[hereinafter Hornstein, Federal Pesticide Regulation]; Finkel, A Second Opinion, supra 
note 3 at 323–24, 330 (“[T]he gulf is not between facts and values, but between value-
laden facts and fact-laden values.”); David A. Wirth & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 
95 Colum. L. Rev. 1857, 1871 (1995) (book review) (describing such trade-offs as 
“Sophie’s choice,” quoting Worst Things First? The Debate over Risk-Based National 
Environmental Priorities 89 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994)) [hereinafter 
Worst Things First?]; Shere, supra note 2, at 410–17. 
29. In this respect, it parallels the regulatory demands of the “unreasonable risk” or 
acceptable risk standard in environmental toxics statutes, the increasing use of which en-
couraged the development of quantitative risk assessment. See Applegate, Unreasonable 
Risk, supra note 25, at 267–77. 
30. For example, in cases such as Gulf South Insulation v. CPSC, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (vacating rule), and Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 
1991) (vacating regulation), the Fifth Circuit took a hard look at the agencies’ risk data and 
analysis even in the absence of a formal risk assessment requirement. 
31. See National Academy of Sciences, Toxicity Testing: Strategies to Determine 
Needs and Priorities 205 (1984) [hereinafter Toxicity Testing] (“The information available 
. . . is scanty, and the resources available . . . do not suffice to test all chemicals for every 
possible health effect.”); Office of Technology Assessment, Complex Cleanup: The Envi-
ronmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Production 62–64 (1991) [hereinafter Complex 
Cleanup] (asserting that “credible data needed for evaluation has not been attained”); Sid-
ney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and 
Legislative Reform, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 5 (1989). 
32. See Wargo, supra note 24, at 275–78; Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in 
the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 773 (1997); Mary L. Lyndon, In-
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government to a lengthy and expensive regulatory burden in which the 
regulated community has distinct advantages.33 As Howard Latin has put 
it, “[a]ny requirement that environmental regulation must be based on 
‘good science’ is not a neutral principle in areas where information scar-
city is endemic and no reasonable scientific consensus exists.”34
Requirements to compare risks exaggerate the foregoing problems.35 
As discussed below in more detail, risk has many more dimensions than 
numerical likelihood of fatal cancer in humans. To compare different 
hazards—dioxin-contaminated effluent from paper mills, workplace ac-
cidents, medical radiation, wetlands destruction, and abandoned land-
fills—by a single metric may help to place the risks in perspective, but it 
does so at the cost of rendering invisible the important differences among 
them.36 Even within the human cancer metric, risk comparison requires 
the development of expensive data for several risks even when only one 
is under regulatory consideration. This requirement inevitably makes the 
development of a regulation far more expensive and time-consuming, 
and less regulation will result. 
In the skeptics’ view, risk assessment is part and parcel of a general 
tendency to reduce public safety and health problems to simplistic calcu-
lations. Risk assessment resembles cost-benefit analysis, in which impor-
tant values like human life and suffering or biodiversity have to be repre-
sented as numerical values such as dollar figures.37 Risk assessment, es-
 
                                                                                                                            
formation Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 
87 Mich. L. Rev. 1795, 1796–99 (1989) [hereinafter Lyndon, Information Economics and 
Chemical Toxicity]. 
33. See Toxicity Testing, supra note 31, at 205; John S. Applegate, Worst Things 
First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 Yale J. 
on Reg. 277, 309–28 (1992) [hereinafter Applegate, Worst Things First] (proposing a way 
to require less information in order to address the scarcity of information in risk assess-
ment); Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity, supra note 32, at 1795, 
1796–99; Milton C. Weinstein, Decision Making for Toxic Substances Control: Cost-
Effective Information Development for the Control of Environmental Carcinogens, 27 Pub. 
Pol. 333, 333 (1979). 
34. Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uni-
form Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1267, 1329 
(1985). 
35. For an introduction to these issues and the numerous points of view on them, see 
Comparing Environmental Risks: Tools for Setting Governmental Priorities (J. Clarence 
Davies ed., 1996); Risk versus Risk (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, 1995); 
Worst Things First? supra note 28; Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law, supra note 
2; John S. Applegate, Comparative Risk Assessment and Environmental Priorities Pro-
jects: A Forum, Not a Formula, 25 N. Ky. L. Rev. 71, 81–87 (1997) [hereinafter Apple-
gate, Comparative Risk Assessment]. 
36. This is a universal concern about comparative risk assessment. See, e.g., M. 
Granger Morgan, Quantitative Risk Ranking: More Promise than the Critics Suggest, in 
Worst Things First? supra note 28, at 133–45; Finkel, A Second Opinion, supra note 3, at 
330; Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 28, at 1875–77; Michael S. Baram, Use of Compara-
tive Risk Methods in Regulatory and Common Law, 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 12 (1987). 
37. A relatively strict version of cost-benefit analysis was required in President 
Reagan’s Executive Order No. 12,291. President Clinton’s more flexible model replaced it 
in Executive Order No. 12,866. 
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pecially quantitative risk assessment, undeniably fits well with cost-
benefit analysis, as the benefits side of the analysis can be characterized 
as reduction of risk. However useful such analyses are in theory, their 
oversimplification of the issues at stake renders them misleading and 
subject to abuse. 
2. Assumptions and Conservatism 
The proponents of risk-assessment requirements have their own 
criticisms of risk assessment as currently practiced. However, unlike the 
foregoing arguments, these critiques aim to perfect what is regarded as a 
fundamentally sound and valuable analytical technique. 
Because the mechanisms of cancer are poorly understood, and be-
cause the routes of exposure from environment to target organ are so 
numerous and complex that they are also poorly defined, risk assessment 
perennially suffers from uncertainty and lack of sufficient data. These 
gaps in understanding must be filled with estimates and assumptions.38 
Advocates of risk assessment often criticize such models for using con-
servative assumptions that overstate risks in the interest of erring on the 
side of safety. 
Some such assumptions concern the toxicity of substances. It is 
typical, at least in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary, to 
assume that a carcinogen has no “threshold” concentration below which 
it poses no risk of causing cancer.39 This assumption may or may not be 
confirmed by existing study data, but the existing data rarely demonstrate 
a clear threshold at very low doses. Therefore, the conservative or pre-
cautionary approach assumes no threshold exists. Likewise, in calculat-
ing dose, assumptions are made about the conversion factor for translat-
ing the results of animal testing to humans, and, in fact, the use of animal 
models at all contains the assumption (also controversial40) that they are 
relevant to human effects. These kinds of assumptions are scientifically 
justified in that there is an empirical or theoretical basis for them and that 
there is not a clear demonstration to the contrary, but it is also a policy 
choice to adopt, in the face of uncertainty, the conservative position.41
 
                                                                                                                            
38. The Red Book anticipates many of these issues in its discussion of the need for 
“inference guidelines.” Red Book, supra note 7, at 51–85. 
39. See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1211 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding EPA’s presumption under the Safe Drinking Water Act that the 
only “safe” level of a carcinogen is zero). 
40. The Delaney Clause of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, for example, 
bans food additives that are carcinogenic “in man or animal,” whereas the Agent Orange 
case dismissed animal studies as largely irrelevant to proving toxic causation in humans. 
21 U.S.C. § 348 (C)(3)(A) (1994) (emphasis added); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liabil-
ity Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
41. See Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment, supra note 7 (explaining justifi-
cations for conservative assumptions); Adam M. Finkel, Is Risk Assessment Really Too 
Conservative?: Revising the Revisionists, 14 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 427 (1989); Talbot Page, 
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It is also a policy choice to adopt multiple conservative assumptions 
in risk assessment, by choosing the conservative assumption each time 
that a data gap is encountered.42 The intended result of multiple conserva-
tism is to overstate risk.43 Risk assessment advocates argue that it is poor 
practice to base regulatory decisions—especially ones with serious eco-
nomic and risk consequences—on knowingly inflated figures. On the 
other hand, Congress and the general public seem to endorse the general 
policy position of precaution and protectiveness. Further, if risk assessors 
truly do not know what the actual values should be, it is entirely possible 
that the results all fall on the wrong end of the spectrum. 
In exposure assessment, the typical unknown is not so much uncer-
tainty as variability. The rate of dermal absorption of a chemical can be 
established with some degree of accuracy, but it may differ significantly 
among individuals. Similarly, children ingest soil at a playground and 
adults drink water from a groundwater source, but there will be consider-
able variation in the amount of soil ingested or water drunk, based on the 
amount of time spent at the location and the particular habits of each per-
son. Such variation applies to groups as well. Some segments of the 
population eat more fish than others, placing them at higher risk from 
environmental contaminants that find their way into fish. Again, the stan-
dard practice is to choose the conservative or precautionary assumption, 
that is, to choose the value that lies at the high end of the exposure spec-
trum. Like the toxicity assumptions, this decision deliberately errs on the 
side of safety by overstating the extent of exposure to hazardous sub-
stances. Thus, given a range of possible exposure values, the assessor 
chooses a point estimate at the high end of the range, which is presumed 
to protect 95 to 99%, or more, of the population. The frequently relied 
upon “maximally exposed individual,” for example, possesses character-
istics designed to assure that almost no one in the world could be more 
exposed. If the risks to such a hypothetical person fall within acceptable 
limits, the idea goes, then a risk assessor can be confident that real peo-
ple are protected. 
To the extent that dose-response estimates are based on a series of 
high-end values or that hypothetical individuals do not reflect the likely 
exposure patterns in the foreseeable and long-term futures, such assump-
tions have been regularly challenged as deliberately counterfactual and 
 
                                                                                                                            
A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 Ecology L.Q. 207, 224–25 (1978) 
(discussing the reasons for adopting worst-case or upper-bound estimates). 
42. This policy was upheld as a matter of statutory interpretation under the Clean 
Air Act in Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 1042 (1980). 
43. Compare Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 851 (1996) (criticizing undue conservatism), with Page, supra note 
41, at 233–36 (justifying worst case estimates by analogy to the problem of false nega-
tives). 
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the resulting risk estimates as exaggerated.44 The estimates represent the 
worst, rather than the expected, case—an issue familiar from the 1986 
revision of NEPA regulations to eliminate the requirement of worst-case 
scenarios in environmental impact statements.45 Deliberate inaccuracy 
makes a weak basis for policymaking, even though protectiveness is 
clearly a legitimate motivation. Inaccuracy can also lead to unnecessarily 
expensive management decisions, which becomes particularly problem-
atic when dealing with finite government resources. The inaccuracy is 
further exacerbated when conservative assumptions are employed to 
compute costs for handling the “last 10%,” the most expensive increment 
of regulation.46
One response to undue conservatism relies on the use of “best esti-
mates” or average values in making assumptions. Unfortunately, the lack 
of information is often so profound that risk assessors do not have a 
“best.” Simply choosing an average is little better, as an average value 
represents no more than a guess at the actual value.47 Such uses of aver-
ages have been analogized to estimating a professional athlete’s salary by 
taking the average of all professional players48—where variation is great, 
the single figure will be highly misleading.49
Another response is to abandon the practice of using point estimates 
in risk assessments in favor of ranges of estimates. If the most accurate 
expression of the actual knowledge of the risk is a range of risks, deci-
sionmakers and the public ought not to make important decisions believ-
ing that the risk has a specific value when it might well be much greater 
or lower. A refinement of risk ranges seeks to assign probabilities to each 
part of the range through a statistical technique called “Monte Carlo” 
analysis, in which the known variation in the various components of the 
 
                                                                                                                            
44. On the other hand, if the exaggeration is fully disclosed, users of the risk as-
sessment can adjust their understanding of the results accordingly. Risk averse users will 
take them at face value to provide a margin of safety; risk neutral users will discount them. 
See, e.g., Contra Costa County v. Pena, 1998 WL 164966, *3, *7–*8 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 
(approving agency’s decision not to follow “upper bound” risk values); Sierra Club v. Utah 
Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board, 964 P.2d 335, 341–44 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(approving agency’s discounting of explicitly “overstated” risk assessment results); Apple-
gate, A Beginning and Not an End, supra note 19, at 1654–55 (describing citizens advisory 
board’s use of high-end results). 
45. See National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable 
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,618–26 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502) (1986) (final 
rule). The Supreme Court affirmed the Council on Environmental Quality’s (“CEQ”) rejec-
tion of worst-case analyses in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 
354–56 (1989). 
46. Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 
10–19 (1993). 
47. See Latin, supra note 14 (criticizing, from an environmentalist’s perspective, the 
choice of default values in EPA’s carcinogen guidelines). 
48. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, supra note 5, at 28. 
49. The toxicity variation has been memorably described as “not knowing whether 
one has enough money to buy a cup of coffee or pay off the national debt.” C. Richard 
Cothern et al., Estimating Risk to Human Health, 20 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 111, 115 (1986). 
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risk calculation are combined repeatedly in random combinations to get a 
sense of the most likely final values.50 The output is, instead of a single 
point value for exposure or simply the range of possible values, a distri-
bution curve showing the relative likelihood of values. 
A final response to undue conservatism is to insist on full disclo-
sure. Since risk assessment is a tool to making fully informed policy de-
cisions, the exponential character of compiling conservative assumptions 
should be disclosed to the public and made available to the decision-
maker. 
B. Risk Legislation 
It may seem odd that the major pieces of regulatory reform legisla-
tion before Congress do not address the substantive problems that such 
legislation seeks to cure. Instead this legislation focuses on a particular 
analytical technique. The explanation probably lies in the relative stabil-
ity of the substantive legal standards in most environmental, safety, and 
health regulation. The “unreasonable risk” standard in the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act,51 the zero-risk standard for food additives (pesti-
cides excepted) in the Delaney Clause,52 the feasibility standard in the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”),53 and their counterparts 
in other statutes,54 have all resisted fundamental change for years or dec-
ades.55
As a result, the battleground on regulation has moved from stan-
dards to the methods for calculating them.56 As risk assessment has as-
sumed central importance to federal regulators in calculating the pre- and 
post-regulation conditions that they must address, it is natural that risk 
 
                                                                                                                            
50. For a thorough and accessible discussion of Monte Carlo analysis, see Susan R. 
Poulter, Monte Carlo Simulation in Environmental Risk Assessment—Science, Policy and 
Legal Issues, 9 Risk 7 (1998). 
51. 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1994). 
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994). 
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(3) (1994). 
54. See Applegate, Unreasonable Risk, supra note 25, at 267–71 (describing the ge-
neric “unreasonable risk” standard). 
55. The recent amendments to the Delaney Clause, see Food Quality Protection Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.), 
and the air toxics section of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, sim-
ply highlight the point. While the obviously arbitrary differentiation between pesticide 
standards and the notoriously dysfunctional hazardous air pollutant provisions were modi-
fied, the core standards for each remained unchanged. The 1996 amendments, Pub. L. No. 
104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (1996), to the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300 (f–j), 
were likewise incremental. 
56. Others have noted the Congressional tendency to focus on the means rather than 
the ends in its oversight of social regulation and have attributed the tendency to the diffi-
culty of reaching agreement on goals. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the 
Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 25–26 (1994) [hereinafter 
Shapiro, Political Oversight]. 
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assessment should become the subject of Congressional attention. The 
allure for those legislators who believe that federal regulation is often 
unnecessarily rigid and stringent, even to the point of irrationality, is that 
risk assessment offers an opportunity to achieve greater flexibility and 
moderation without changing the underlying, politically durable substan-
tive standards. 
Several risk assessment reform bills have been introduced in Con-
gress as a way to moderate the impact of the underlying legislation. The 
103rd Congress saw bills that required additional use of risk-assessment 
methodologies, but none, except for a modest requirement in the De-
partment of Agriculture Reorganization Act, was enacted.57 Risk-
assessment bills in the 104th Congress were legion.58 Some, such as 
H.R. 9,59 H.R. 1022,60 and S. 343,61 were wide-ranging regulatory reform 
efforts that imposed an array of analytical and procedural requirements 
on regulatory decisionmaking. Others, such as S. 333,62 were limited to 
risk assessment and emphasized the careful use of limited resources. 
None passed Congress; however, relatively modest risk assessment pro-
vision was successfully inserted into the revisions of the Safe Drinking 
Water Act.63
The principal risk proposal in the 105th Congress was the Levin-
Thompson bill, S. 981.64 As amended,65 it was a compromise measure that 
won bipartisan support. A bill by Senator Thompson (without Levin)— 
sporting not one but two new euphemisms for risk-cost-benefit analysis, 
 
                                                                                                                            
57. 7 U.S.C. § 2204(e) (1994) (establishing an Office of Risk Assessment and Cost-
Benefit Analysis in the Department of Agriculture). 
58. For a detailed review of the 104th Congress bills, see Robert M. Simon, Issues 
in Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis and Their Relationship to Regulatory Re-
form, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1611 (1995). 
59. 104th Cong. (1995). H.R. 9 was part of the so-called Contract with America, 
which included among its goals limiting federal regulation partly through additional pro-
cedural requirements. See Bob Benenson, House Easily Passes Bills to Limit Regulations, 
53 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 679, 681–82 (1995) (quoting House Rules Committee Chairman 
Gerald Solomon, “For years, business and industry have been forced to jump through 
hoops to satisfy regulators in the bureaucracy. Well, if this legislation becomes law, we are 
going to turn that around.”). For further discussion of this point, see Wagner, Congress, 
Science, and Environmental Policy, supra note 4. 
60. 104th Cong. (1995). The bill originated as Title III of H.R. 9, but was later sev-
ered to make passage easier. 
61. 104th Cong. (1995). Introduced by Senator Robert Dole, S. 343, together with 
Amendment No. 229, is styled as an amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551. (1988), and covers approximately the same territory as H.R. 9. 
62. 104th Cong. (1995). S. 333 was limited in scope to risk assessment and to the 
environmental restoration activities of the Department of Energy. Id. § 4(a). It is modeled 
on legislation introduced by Senator Johnston in the 103d Congress. Senators Murkowski 
and Lott also proposed Amendment No. 230, which would have expanded the application 
of S. 333 to all environmental regulation and add a provision for judicial review. Amend. 
No. 230, 104th Cong. (§§ 622, 627) (1995) (proposed by Sen. Murkowski and Sen. Lott). 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1996). 
64. 105th Cong. (1997). 
65. S. 1644, 105th Cong. (1998) (reported out of committee Mar. 10, 1998). 
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“regulatory right-to-know” and “regulatory accounting statement”—
would require the agency to “present the most plausible level of risk 
practical.”66 Again, none of these bills passed Congress. 
There are a number of elements in these bills that can be expected to 
appear in proposals for legislation in the 106th Congress. Appendix II 
summarizes the provisions and their locations. For clarity, Appendix II 
contrasts the broader anti-regulation bills of the 104th Congress with the 
compromise version in the 105th Congress. It also compares these with 
the elements of President Clinton’s Executive Order No. 12,866 and the 
Clinton Administration’s Risk Principles.67
Most legislative proposals to require risk assessments were drafted 
as amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act. While a logical lo-
cation for an analytical tool and an addition to the procedures to be fol-
lowed in administrative action, it understates the substantive significance 
of risk assessment. Even if the requirement to perform formal risk as-
sessments is strictly procedural like NEPA, it is clearly designed to have 
an impact on the outcome of decisions under those legal standards. So, 
like NEPA, a risk-assessment requirement should have a separate identity 
to highlight its substantive as well as procedural significance for health, 
safety, and environmental regulation. 
III. The Draft Guidelines 
This Part sets out the basic principles that underlie the proposed 
Guidelines and together lay out a vision of the function of risk assess-
ment in the regulatory decisionmaking process. Briefly stated, the Guide-
lines rest on the view that risk assessment can be an important and useful 
tool in analyzing the regulatory proposals of agencies of the federal gov-
ernment, but that risk assessment, like any serious tool, must be em-
ployed only for appropriate tasks, practiced by skilled persons, and al-
ways used with care. 
The proposed Guidelines also seek to reflect what might be called 
the consensus state of the art of risk assessment, as embodied in the most 
recent of the National Academy of Sciences’ major reports on risk as-
sessment, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (1994) and Under-
standing Risk (1996); the report of the Presidential/Congressional Com-
mission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, Risk Assessment and 
 
                                                                                                                            
66. S. 2161, 105th Cong. § 4(d)(2) (1998). 
67. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 §§ 3(f), 6(a) (1993); Dep’t of 
Energy, Risk Assessment, Management, and Communication and Priority Setting (1995), 
reprinted in Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End, supra note 19, at 1675–77. The Risk 
Principles were drafted by an interagency group under the auspices of the Office of Sci-
ence and Technology Policy and formally adopted by the Department of Energy for use in 
its sizable environmental remediation program. 
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Risk Management in Regulatory Decision-Making (1997); EPA’s Guid-
ance for Risk Characterization (1995) and Proposed Guidelines for Eco-
logical Risk Assessment (1996)68; and the Administration’s Risk Princi-
ples (1995). The proposal attempts to account for important criticisms of 
risk-assessment practices, particularly when they can be fairly reflected as 
caveats to the general consensus position. The recommendation does not 
deliberately track, nor does it endorse, specific legislative proposals, 
though the amended Levin-Thompson bill69 is for the most part consistent 
with the recommendation. 
 
1. Risk assessment considers an important and useful but not com-
prehensive set of information relevant to regulatory decisions. 
 
Even the earliest statements of the risk-assessment methodology 
cautioned: “Risk assessment is only one aspect of the process of regula-
tory control of hazardous substances.”70 This caveat becomes increas-
ingly important as regulators direct risk assessment toward areas that do 
not involve hazardous substances. Even so, a quick glance at federal en-
vironmental statutes reveals that human health risk is not the only goal 
served by the environmental statutes, and the statutes do not exclude 
non-risk considerations in setting standards.71 The Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(“CERCLA”) requires remedial actions to be “protective of human health 
and the environment,”72 as do virtually all of the other major environ-
mental statutes. Ecosystem damage is not only an entirely different type 
of risk from human health,73 but it also implicates other important values, 
such as respect for nature or the unique qualities of individual species 
and habitats, that are not captured by risk per se. Likewise, aquifers are 
not only a potential pathway of exposure to hazards, they are also an im-
portant resource whose integrity should be protected. Whether or not 
regulators can discern some long-term tangible human benefit from natu-
ral resources and ecosystems, their protection is firmly embedded in 
United States environmental law and policy. 
 
                                                                                                                            
68. See Proposed Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,552, 
47,555–56 (1996) (describing function of risk assessment) [hereinafter PGERA]. 
69. See supra note 65. 
70. Red Book, supra note 7, at 48; see also Richard A. Merrill, Federal Regulation 
of Cancer-Causing Chemicals, in 2 Administrative Conference of the United States: Rec-
ommendations and Reports 21 (1982) (outlining federal regulation of cancer-causing 
chemicals). 
71. See Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End, supra note 19. 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). 
73. The methods for evaluating ecological risk parallel those for human health risk, 
but they are necessarily more general and comprehensive, covering both more species and 
more stressors. See generally PGERA, supra note 68 (proposing a method that is drawn 
from chemical risk assessment). 
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Similarly, cultural and historical values may inform our understand-
ing of what requires regulatory attention, how much, and when. For ex-
ample, at the Department of Energy’s Hanford site in eastern Washing-
ton, soil and groundwater contamination put Native Americans at risk in 
their subsistence and religious use of parts of the site. Given the history 
of unconcern for Native American traditions, one justifiable policy might 
be restoring such areas despite relatively low quantified risks. Further, 
the relatively amorphous concerns of quality of life and public anxiety 
ought to be considered,74 though perhaps not as a dominant factor. Emo-
tional distress is often the major item of damages in a toxic tort suit,75 
and anxiety may be the day-to-day effect of unremedied environmental 
risks. Culpability also has great relevance to the need for action.76 There 
is a world of difference, as radon abatement programs have shown, be-
tween reactions to a naturally occurring substance in the home and, say, 
chemical emissions from nearby industries. In the case of polluted fed-
eral facilities, the fundamental wrongness of a government agency poi-
soning the environment and putting at risk the health of the people whom 
it serves creates a moral imperative for remedial action not captured by 
risk assessment alone.77
As the environmental justice movement has made clear, risks are 
not distributed evenly across the population. Wealth, race, neighborhood, 
advanced age, and infancy can all make significant differences in suscep-
tibility and degree of exposure.78 Health risks cannot be completely char-
acterized without considering specially impacted subpopulations, “hot 
spots” of multiple exposure, highly exposed persons, or even identifiable 
individuals.79 Distribution may be unequal across time as well—what we 
put off today, we impose on our children—so intergenerational equity 
should be a concern.80 Intergenerational responsibility creates a moral 
 
                                                                                                                            
74. See California Comparative Risk Project, supra note 21, at 33–36 (examining 
the impact of environmental problems on “social welfare”). 
75. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1202 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(awarding damages for post-traumatic stress disorder and emotional suffering). 
76. See Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End, supra note 19, at 1662. 
77. This imperative is reflected in Congressional inclusion of federal facilities in the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and CERCLA, and in the enactment 
of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1994), which allows states to 
fine the federal government for RCRA violations. 
78. See Kuehn, supra note 2, at 116–29 (describing methodological inadequacies in 
standard risk assessment techniques). 
79. See Complex Cleanup supra note 31, at 63 (criticizing the Department of En-
ergy’s assessment plan because it failed to consider multiple contaminants or identify the 
“most exposed individual”); Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law, supra note 2, at 
592–95 (criticizing “hard” comparative risk assessment that only evaluates how many 
people will suffer); Wargo, supra note 24, at 172–248 (documenting the heightened sus-
ceptibility of children to toxic substances, due to differences in physiology and diet, and 
criticizing the use of averages in data that fail to reflect variance in susceptibility). 
80. See Nat’l. Academy of Pub. Admin., Deciding for the Future: Balancing Risks, 
Costs, and Benefits Fairly Across Generations (1997); Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to 
Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity 
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mandate to address problems that are modest now but will significantly 
worsen over time. 
Regulatory decisions regularly hinge on factors other than health. 
Cost, values, overarching policies, and administrative feasibility all have 
a place in risk management, so risk assessment ought not to be the sole 
criterion for regulatory decisions. The extent of the available informa-
tion, the tractability of a problem,81 and the administrability of the reme-
dy82 are also relevant. An environmental regulator should always be look-
ing for fundamental changes in processes or products that would remedy 
several environmental problems at once or would anticipate and prevent 
problems.83 Risk legislation should not make risk the dominant analytical 
test to the exclusion of the foregoing factors. 
 
2. The purpose of risk assessment is to gather, analyze, organize, 
and present relevant information; it should not itself be an argument for 
or dictate a particular substantive outcome. 
 
The Red Book distinguished between risk assessment and risk man-
agement as a way to encourage analysis to be as outcome-neutral as pos-
sible and to make explicit the policy choices in the risk management 
phase. While the reality and desirability of the assessment-management 
distinction has been assailed, the combination of seeking unbiased input 
and candid decisions seems an appropriate goal of a regulatory deci-
sionmaking system.84 Risk assessment provides a framework in which to 
organize and focus attention on a wide range of relevant data. Clearly, 
assumptions and policy choices within risk assessment must be fully dis-
closed and explained, but once that is done, the information is usually 
highly pertinent. 
 
                                                                                                                            
5–45 (1989) (describing the planet as a “global commons” shared by all generations and 
contending that law should reflect this viewpoint). 
81. See Adam Finkel, Do We Know Enough to Take a Risk-Based Approach?, EPA 
J., Mar./Apr. 1991, at 38 (“the most sophisticated ranking of risks and benefits will be a 
vain exercise unless EPA is committed to controlling even the small risks when the solu-
tion is cheap or economically beneficial and dedicated to searching for new ways to ame-
liorate what seem to be large but intractable risks.”) 
82. See Merrill, supra note 70, at 114–17 (“Agencies should not shrink from con-
tested proceedings when health risks are high, but they should consider their ability to 
enforce any formal limit they set.”). 
83. See Hornstein, Federal Pesticide Regulation, supra note 28, at 405–06 (articu-
lating a “cause-oriented approach” to environmental law reform that would focus on incen-
tives to cause environmental problems and the role that disincentives could play in solving 
them); Bernard D. Goldstein, If Risk Management Is Broke, Why Fix Risk Assessment?, 
EPA J. Jan./Mar. 1993, at 23 (“While continuing to emphasize risk assessment as a means 
to prioritize the approach to existing problems, EPA needs to assign a high level of priority 
to the much more cost-effective approach of anticipating and preventing new environ-
mental problems.”). 
84. The Red Book’s authors harbored no illusions about the absoluteness of the dis-
tinction, but saw it as a desirable aspiration. See Red Book, supra note 7, at 18–19. 
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However, risk information does not and should not dictate the out-
come of the regulatory process. Additional information, policy considera-
tions, and arguments should go into the final decision. For example, Dale 
Hattis proposes four values that health and safety regulation should em-
body: fairness in the distribution of risks and benefits, fairness in deci-
sionmaking, effectiveness, and the principle “first, do no harm.”85 All of 
these values require risk information to be analyzed, but none are fully 
determined by that analysis.86 Efforts to make the results of risk assess-
ments dispositive for regulatory decisions or priorities would not only 
blur the difference between analysis and decision, but would altogether 
miss the important elements described above. Put another way, regula-
tory decisions in the areas of health, safety, and the environment should 
be risk-informed, but not necessarily risk-determined. 
The idea of a “supermandate”—that is, including in risk legislation 
a requirement that the risk-reduction benefits of a regulatory measure 
outweigh its costs in all health, safety, and environmental regulations87—
does not in principle run afoul of the risk assessment-management dis-
tinction. However, the proposed Guidelines reject this approach for sev-
eral reasons. First, it is unwise to set out a single substantive standard for 
all regulation in the multifarious areas of federal activity without a full 
inquiry into the important differences among the various areas. Second, 
while the differences in the substantive standards in the different pieces 
of legislation can be frustrating and occasionally lead to conflicts among 
statutory schemes, the statutory standards were written purposefully, and 
it is highly unlikely that, upon investigation, those reasons will be found 
to be misguided. Third, the use of an apparently procedural requirement 
in an administrative procedure statute is a disingenuous way to effect a 
substantive change in a vast range of legislation that enjoys widespread 
popular support. While many observers are frustrated with the inability to 
obtain reform of the substantive legal standards, a sub rosa assault via 
administrative procedures undermines democratic debate. 
 
3. Risk assessment requirements must allow for flexibility to ac-
count for a variety of applications of the tool—safety as well as health, 
acute risks as well as chronic ones—and for developments in methodol-
ogy and scientific knowledge. Risk assessors should exercise their pro-
fessional but be subject to the requirements of identifying and explaining 
their judgements. Peer review should be limited to discrete issues upon 
which there is considerable disagreement, uncertainty, or other difficulty. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
85. Dale Hattis, Drawing the Line: Quantitative Criteria for Risk Management, 
Env’t., July/Aug. 1996, at 10,36–38. 
86. Id. 
87. H.R. 9 § 422(a) and S. 343 § 623(a)(1) included supermandate provisions. 
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Whatever its limitations and policy content, risk assessment remains 
a fairly new scientific methodology. Like all sciences, it will and should 
grow and change over time, and it depends on the professional judgment 
of its practitioners. Risk assessment is a changing field with new meth-
ods, new science, and new information constantly developing, all of 
which should be evaluated before being adopted or discarded. Profes-
sional judgment best fits the technique to the situation. For example, an 
analytical framework based on human carcinogens may well make little 
sense for non-carcinogens or for non-chemical stressors on a critical 
habitat. Indeed, the Red Book paradigm may make no sense at all for 
mechanical accidents in which the effects are deterministic rather than 
stochastic or statistical. For these reasons, one size in risk-assessment 
methodology does not fit all situations, and there should be a consider-
able degree of flexibility in the choice of method and its application. The 
role of the law, therefore, should be to protect that flexibility and devel-
opment, and not to constrain the practice of risk assessment to one 
model.88 As Justice Breyer recently said, “The practice of science de-
pends on sound law—law that at a minimum supports science by offering 
the scientist breathing space.”89
The expertise to develop and apply analytical methods resides indi-
vidually in professional risk assessors. It resides institutionally in the 
agencies that use risk assessments. Agencies use risk assessment for sev-
eral different regulatory purposes and apply them to thousands of differ-
ent potential hazards. The best understanding of the particular needs of 
the substantive area of regulation resides in the relevant agency. There-
fore, the imposition of uniform, detailed guidance for all risk assess-
ments (either in legislation or by a centralizing agency like the Office of 
Management and Budget (“OMB”)) should be approached with great 
caution.90 The agency making the decision should retain the ultimate re-
sponsibility for the choice of method and the information that goes into 
it. 
The use of peer review should be subject to Guideline Seven; that 
is, it should match the significance and difficulty of the issue. A blanket 
requirement that all risk assessments be reviewed would simply add an-
other stage and new expense to routine risk assessments without com-
mensurate value being added to the final product, especially when critics 
of the assessment already have the opportunity to participate as sug-
gested by the Guidelines. Delay and expense—both of which limit regu-
 
                                                                                                                            
88. This danger of freezing current analytical techniques in place has been used as 
an argument against any legislative risk assessment requirement. See Junius C. McElveen, 
Jr. & Chris Amantea, Legislating Risk Assessment, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1553 (1995). 
89. Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 280 Science 537, 537 
(1998). 
90. The track record on congressional micromanagement is generally thought to be 
poor. See Shapiro, Political Oversight, supra note 56, at 25–26. 
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latory output—systematically benefit the subjects of regulation, at least 
when the agency has the burden of going forward and of justifying its 
actions. Therefore, without commensurate value being added to the final 
product, a blanket requirement of peer review would simply stymie 
agency action under protective social legislation. 
In the risk assessment reform bills, the commitment to broad peer 
review requirements as the guarantor of “sound science” in risk assess-
ment is, interestingly, either a rather contingent position or one which 
divides the Republican Party membership. In the debate over acid rain 
legislation, in which industry and the Republican political position op-
posed significant further regulation, peer reviewed science (which sug-
gested the existence of an acid rain problem) was regularly characterized 
as the problem, not the solution. Representative George E. Brown, Jr., the 
ranking Democrat on the House committee investigating the issue, de-
scribed the Republican members’ position as follows: 
Subcommittee Members were quite comfortable both in enthusias-
tically accepting the policy pronouncements of “skeptic” scientists 
and in demeaning the careful peer-review efforts of traditional sci-
entists. Peer review was almost flippantly dismissed as politically 
correct tyranny, as opposed to the true scientific breakthroughs gen-
erated by the unconventional and skeptical innovator.91
Peer review is neither inherently good nor bad, but its advocacy or rejec-
tion may reflect political expediency as well as the search for truth.92 In 
accordance with the current practice of several agencies, peer review 
should therefore be limited to discrete issues upon which there is consid-
erable disagreement, uncertainty, or other difficulty.93
 
4. Risk assessments must explicitly acknowledge and explain the 
limitations of the process in terms of methodology, data, assumptions, 
uncertainty, variability, and qualitative characteristics of risk. Thus, 
agencies should use qualitative risk assessments when uncertainty or the 
 
                                                                                                                            
91. George E. Brown, Jr., Environmental Science Under Siege: Fringe Science and 
the 104th Congress, Report to the Democratic Caucus of the Comm. on Science, U.S. 
House of Representatives (1996); see also George E. Brown, Jr., Environmental Science 
Under Siege in the U.S. Congress, Env’t., Mar. 1997, at 12. 
This episode is described as part of a comprehensive treatment of the congressional 
use and misuse of science in Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, supra 
note 4. 
92. For some, expense and delay were apparently the main purposes of these re-
quirements, see supra note 59 (describing H.R. 9 and quoting Rep. Solomon). 
93. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Biotechnology and the Design of Regulation, 
17 Ecology L.Q. 1, 63–65 (1990) (discussing current practice); see also Sidney A. Shapiro, 
Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures: Evaluating the FDA’s Public 
Board of Inquiry, 1986 Duke L.J. 288, 305 n.122; Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting 
OSHA, supra note 31, at 35–36 (discussing then-current FDA practice). 
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qualitative aspects of risk predominate. Direct evidence of risks should 
be used when it is available and reliable; otherwise, it is appropriate to 
use standardized, protective “default” assumptions. 
 
The data do not exist to support firm quantitative descriptions of 
most environmental problems.94 For example, the data do not exist to 
evaluate fully even the 189 hazardous air pollutants identified by Con-
gress in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments,95 and in 1986, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) could provide “safety assurances” 
for only 37 of the 600 active ingredients in registered pesticides.96 This 
“data gap” could to some extent be remedied by massive spending on 
data generation and gathering, but such a program would still leave a 
substantial area of uncertainty which results from our incomplete scien-
tific understanding of the effects of pollutants in the environment. More-
over, many risk phenomena involve wide ranges of variability. These 
gaps and uncertainties must be managed by the use of assumptions and 
default values or expressed with risk ranges. It is frequently the case that 
regulatory agencies and courts want firm answers from scientists in order 
to render and justify important decisions on pressing issues, and it is 
tempting to insist on such answers. But certainty and the means of 
achieving it cannot be created by statute where it does not otherwise ex-
 
                                                                                                                            
94. On the lack of data generally, see Applegate, Unreasonable Risk, supra note 25, 
at 284–98; Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity, supra note 32. For 
specific situations, see Wargo, Our Children’s Toxic Legacy, supra note 24, at 270–76; 
Complex Cleanup, supra note 31, at 62–64; John Chelen, Erasing the Data Deficit, Envtl. 
Forum, Jan./Feb. 1998, at 35; Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacturing of Toxic 
Products, supra note 32, at 733; Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting OSHA, supra note 31, at 
5; Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity, supra note 32, at 1796–99. In 
its study of carcinogens in the human diet, the NAS concluded: 
Numerous and extensive gaps in the current knowledge base were apparent as the 
committee endeavored to examine the risk of human cancer from naturally occurring ver-
sus synthetic components of the diet. These gaps are so large—and resources are so lim-
ited—that careful prioritization of further research efforts is essential. The following rec-
ommendations emphasize the need for expanded epidemiologic studies, more human expo-
sure data, improved and enhanced testing methods, more detailed data on dietary compo-
nents, and further mechanistic studies, if these gaps are to be filled. These research en-
deavors may prove inadequate, however, when the complexity and variability of diets and 
food composition, as well as human behavior, are considered. 
National Research Council, Carcinogens and Anticarcinogens in the Human Diet 
11–12 (1996). EPA was acutely aware of the problem in its comparative risk studies, see 
Unfinished Business, supra note 26, at 14, 35–41; EPA, Science Advisory Board, Reduc-
ing Risk: Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection 8 (1990). More-
over, it is a persistent theme of comparative risk critics. See Jonathan Bender, Societal Risk 
Reduction: Promise and Pitfalls, 3 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 255 (1995); see also Robin Shifrin, 
Note, Not by Risk Alone: Reforming EPA Research Priorities, 102 Yale L.J. 547, 559–65 
(1992); Paul A. Locke, The Limitations of Comparative Risk Assessment, 2 Shepard’s Ex-
pert & Sci. Evid. 75, 84–90 (1994).  
95. Science and Judgement in Risk Assessment, supra note 7, at 144–59. 
96. James H. Colopy, Poisoning the Developing World: The Exportation of Unregis-
tered and Severely Restricted Pesticides from the United States, 13 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & 
Pol’y 167, 171 nn.18–19 (1995). 
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ist. Worse, risk assessment statutes may actually encourage risk assessors 
to adopt specific values designed to support, post hoc, the desired out-
come.97
The law must not require of science and scientists a degree of ap-
parent certainty or precision that they cannot provide. Proposals to re-
quire “best estimates” and “realistic” or “central” assumptions in all 
cases make such demands.98 The Safe Drinking Water Act revision, for 
example, requires EPA to “specify, to the extent practicable . . . the ex-
pected risk or central estimate of risk for specific populations.”99 To some 
extent a subsequent requirement to disclose “each appropriate upper-
bound or lower-bound estimate of risk”100 makes this requirement sensi-
bly display the range of risk values, but it still runs afoul of the fact that 
risk assessors often have no real basis for a best estimate. Moreover, to 
the extent that “central estimate” means an average or median value, it is 
an arbitrary choice without knowing that a symmetrical distribution of 
probabilities occurs. 
Assumptions and estimates are essential to risk calculations because 
of the great uncertainty that surrounds risk assessments. There are many 
sources of uncertainty, and the results of the assessment depend upon 
their resolution. While extreme or counterfactual scenarios may overstate 
the risk, choosing an average value does not necessarily provide the 
“right” or even the most probable risk level. Scenarios that are realistic 
today do not necessarily account for future conditions, and typical or rep-
resentative people do not necessarily account for those individuals who 
are exposed at significantly higher levels or who have special sensitivi-
ties.101
Safety, health, and environmental legislation uniformly make pre-
vention of harm their object, and therefore the use of conservative or pro-
tective scenarios falls entirely within that overarching legislative pol-
icy.102 With this position in mind, it is best to allow professional risk as-
 
                                                                                                                            
97. On the problem of policy masquerading as science, see Shapiro, Biotechnology 
and the Design of Regulation, supra note 93, at 65–66; Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting 
OSHA, supra note 31, at 36. 
98. See S. 333, 104th Cong. § 3(1) (1995) (defining “best estimate” as “the most 
unbiased representation of the most plausible level of risk”); S. 333 Amend. 230, 104th 
Cong. § 621(3) (Feb. 3, 1995) (defining “best estimate” to include “[c]entral estimates of 
risk using the most plausible assumptions”); H.R. 9, 104th Cong. § 3107(3) (1995) (same). 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(B)(ii) (1994). 
100. Id. § 300g-1(b)(3)(B)(iii) (1994). 
101. For example, children have a particular sensitivity to lead. See Lead Industries 
Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1138–42, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 
(1980); see also Wargo, supra note 24, at 172–200 (describing the increased susceptibility 
of children to environmental toxics). The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 requires 
EPA to consider the effects of additives on infants and children when establishing toler-
ance levels. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
102. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13–28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) 
(finding that Congress intended a Clean Air Act provision to be precautionary in nature 
and thus not requiring proof of actual harm before regulating), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 
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sessors to choose how to evaluate and express risk, provided that they 
thoroughly explain their choices in the risk assessment analysis. Such a 
result leaves the user of any given risk assessment with a fuller under-
standing of the issues and in a better position to make judgments.103 In-
deed, standard default values were originally intended to reduce the sub-
jectivity of risk assessment by replacing case-by-case judgments about 
the weight of the evidence.104 Moreover, default assumptions are not al-
ways too conservative.105 For example, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration’s (“OSHA”) regulation of formaldehyde was re-
manded by the D.C. Circuit because its notoriously conservative default 
estimates and assumptions yielded a much lower risk than epidemiologi-
cal studies sponsored by the industry itself.106 Agencies should, of course, 
substitute actual values for defaults when such data are available and 
more plausible than the defaults, but risk assessors should not be re-
quired to abandon default values when the proposed “actual” ones are in 
the risk assessors’ judgment unproven or against the weight of the evi-
dence. 
Numerical estimates of the risk of human cancer fatalities (which is 
the model for all of the risk-assessment requirements) are an incomplete 
way of viewing environmental problems. Without more, such estimates 
describe neither the distribution of risk (is it fairly uniform across the 
population or is it focused on a small geographic or demographic 
group?), nor the source of the risk (is it a well-operated steel mill or a 
midnight dumper?). The distribution of the risk and its source raise the 
question of the equity or fairness of the risky activity. Voluntarily as-
sumed risks or risks over which exposed persons exercise some control 
are understood differently from those imposed involuntarily on others, 
especially those wrongfully imposed. Further, a small risk of a catastro-
phic result may mathematically be the same as a larger risk of a less dire 
outcome, but people are generally more concerned with a catastrophe, 
either for themselves in the form of a dreaded disease or for the popula-
tion generally in a Chernobyl-like disaster.107 Although these qualitative 
aspects of risk are not captured in most risk assessments, there is no rea-
son why they cannot be expressed through a more narrative presenta-
 
                                                                                                                            
(1976). See also Finkel, A Second Opinion, supra note 3, at 339-40 (arguing that a “better 
safe than sorry” policy is best). But see Cross, supra note 43. 
103. See, e.g., Bernard D. Goldstein, Risk Management Will Not Be Improved by 
Mandating Numerical Uncertainty Analysis for Risk Assessment, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1599, 
1601 (1995) (arguing for disclosure of uncertainty but against required numerical analy-
sis); Arlene Yang, Standards and Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, 3 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 523 
(1995) (arguing that guidelines should focus the uncertainty and policy debate surrounding 
risk issues, not attempt to resolve it). 
104. See Kuehn, supra note 2, at 137. 
105. See Finkel, supra note 41, at 441-47.  
106. See Int’l Union, UAW v. Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
107. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 20, at 1072–73, 1078–80. 
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tion.108 Therefore, the Guidelines instruct risk assessors to examine dif-
ferent types of risks and their characteristics. 
Qualitative elements in risk assessment are not a novelty. Even an 
aggressive cost-benefit requirement like President Reagan’s Executive 
Order No. 12,291 permitted the use of unquantified elements, and Presi-
dent Clinton’s substitute, No. 12,866, is more generous with qualitative 
information. Gilbert Omenn, head of the Presidential/Congressional 
Commission on Risk Assessment, has said: 
The descriptive and evaluative features are more important than the 
quantitative estimate of the magnitude of the risk or probability of 
occurrence. Likewise, description of the sources and significance of 
the assumptions and uncertainties is at least as important as any 
quantitative modeling of those uncertainties.109
Good examples of effects that should be assessed but defy quantification 
include ecological risk110 and harms to American Indian culture resulting 
from the destruction or contamination of traditionally used places, plants, 
and animals.111
Moving toward qualitative risk assessment addresses these con-
cerns. Quantification is not essential to risk assessment, which can effec-
tively present and organize relevant data without specific numerical val-
ues. Qualitative risk assessment further avoids the problems of undue 
conservatism, it encourages fuller narrative description of risks, and it 
avoids reliance on uncertain point estimates. For these reasons, many 
comparative risk projects have eschewed quantification,112 and other risk-
 
                                                                                                                            
108. See Gilbert Omenn, Making Use of Cancer Risk Assessment, 12 Issues in Sci. 
& Tech. 29 (1996). 
109. Id. at 31. See generally Alfred W. Crosby, The Measure of Reality: Quantifica-
tion and Western Society, 1250–1600 (1997) (discussing what is gained and lost through 
quantification). Likewise, one year earlier, Gail Charnley, who was executive director of 
the Commission, wrote: 
Defenders . . . seem to believe that the performance of an “unbiased” risk as-
sessment and cost/benefit analysis will magically make the appropriate regula-
tory decision apparent. Practicing risk assessors can tell you, however, that 
risk assessment is an imprecise tool at best. It is a useful way to organize un-
certain scientific information for decisionmaking, but it is not a scientific 
method of assessing actual health risks . . . . Risk assessment and cost/benefit 
analysis are useful tools, but they do not really provide a “valuable new para-
digm for federal environmental regulation . . . .” 
Gail Charnley, 11 Issues in Sci. & Tech. 8 (1995) (letter to the editor). 
110. See Atcheson, supra note 2, at 1387–89. 
111. See Stuart G. Harris & Barbara L. Harper, A Native American Exposure Sce-
nario, 17 Risk Analysis 789 (1997). 
112. See Applegate, Comparative Risk Assessment, supra note 35, at 81–82. 
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assessment projects have begun to explore qualitative methodologies.113 
The Guidelines urge the use of unquantified risk assessments where un-
certainty or the qualitative aspects of risk predominate. 
 
5. Risk comparisons can be helpful for placing risks in context for 
standard setting or priority setting, but the comparisons should be ap-
proached with great caution and comparison of unlike risks should be 
avoided. 
 
No one—scientists, risk assessors, or regulators—can visualize 
what a one-in-a-million lifetime risk of cancer means. On the one hand, it 
seems quite unlikely for any given individual. On the other hand, the 
costs of being that one person in a million seem quite high. One of the 
major challenges of communicating information about risk is putting risk 
into a meaningful context for lay audiences, for scientists, and for poli-
cymakers.114 One way to accomplish this goal is to compare the risk un-
der consideration with other, more familiar risks, as one might express 
the length of the Titanic in terms of football fields. This comparison not 
only helps in understanding just how big the ship was, but it also helps in 
evaluating the length for a specific purpose, such as determining whether 
it is possible to build a full-size replica for a movie set. The same tech-
nique has been used with risk assessment, for similar purposes. Knowing 
how the risk of death from a chemical exposure compares in magnitude 
to being hit by lightning helps, in theory, to understand the risk and to 
evaluate potential responses.115 Hence, some risk-assessment bills man-
date comparisons with “familiar” risks. 
The obvious difficulty with this technique is what might be called 
the “apples and oranges” problem. The Titanic and football fields are 
comparable in length, but in little else. Likewise, apples and oranges may 
be compared, as long as the criteria for comparison are clearly under-
stood and are material to the decision to be made. With risk, the problem 
is that death—the usual common metric—does not constitute an all-
inclusive basis for comparison among environmental problems.116 As dis-
cussed above, many kinds of risks affect groups of people and the envi-
ronment in varied ways. In addition, the risk of death from cancer is an 
important endpoint, but cancer is not the only disease of concern to regu-
 
                                                                                                                            
113. See Consortium for Environmental Risk Evaluation (CERE), Interim Risk Re-
port, Health and Ecological Risks at the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Weapons 
Complex: A Qualitative Evaluation (1995). 
114. See generally Understanding Risk, supra note 7; Presidential/Congres- sional 
Comm’n, supra note 8; National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication, supra 
note 7 (all describing the role of risk assessment in public deliberation on risk issues). 
115. For an example of this approach, see the “risk ladder” presented in Justice 
Breyer’s widely read book on risk regulation. Breyer, supra note 46, at 3–5. 
116. See Adam M. Finkel, Comparing Risks Thoughtfully, 7 Risk: Health, Safety & 
Env’t. 325, 330–35 (1996). 
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lators. Other health risks which science does not fully understand, such 
as endocrine disrupters and genetic mutagens, require attention. 
Further, many risks covered by federal regulations do not involve 
death from chronic illness. Serious and debilitating occupational or rec-
reational injuries and harms to the environment cannot readily be meas-
ured against a single yardstick. Avoidable risks, too, might be viewed 
quite differently from unavoidable ones,117 just as voluntarily assumed 
risks are different from those imposed by others. In sum, a “familiar”118 
risk is not the same as a similar risk, and comparison of dissimilar risks 
is only marginally useful and highly subject to manipulation. 
Another difficulty with risk comparison arises from the same uncer-
tainty and variability that plagues other uses of risk assessment. In the 
first place, the comparative data ought to be of the same or similar qual-
ity to the risk being assessed. In two recent reexaminations of risk- and 
cost-ranking lists that have been widely used to support the claim that 
regulation is irrationally strict, careful study of the underlying data has 
shown that most of the values used in the comparison lists range from 
questionable to baseless.119 Comparisons based on anecdotes and unsub-
stantiated analyses are not acceptable. The caveats that apply to point 
estimates of the principal risks also apply to comparators. Once uncer-
tainty and ranges are accounted for, it may be that many comparisons 
will overlap, limiting the utility of the comparative exercise. 
The fundamental problem with risk comparisons as a part of the 
analysis of regulatory action is the implicit assumption that higher risks 
will be addressed. If, for example, the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) only has jurisdiction over foods and drugs, opportunities for 
greater risk reduction in highway design are irrelevant to FDA’s judg-
ments about the risks of a particular pharmaceutical product.120 Or to say 
 
                                                                                                                            
117. Kip Viscusi gives the example of the greater risk of death from the earth being 
hit by a “doomsday” asteroid than an American worker being killed on the job (1/6,000 vs. 
1/10,000). See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for 
Risk 5 (1992). These numbers seem suspect in themselves, perhaps because of the respec-
tive time frames. Even so, the asteroid risk does not render the occupational risk negligi-
ble, because little can be done to prevent the former, and much can be done to prevent the 
latter.  
118. Familiarity also tends to encourage comfort or complacency about risks, in 
which case comparison with a familiar risk would encourage the following syllogism: I’m 
not unduly concerned about dying in an automobile accident; an automobile accident is 
much more likely than death from dioxin emissions; therefore I shouldn’t be concerned 
about dioxin emissions. The Guidelines deplore this kind of manipulative use of risk as-
sessment. The classic work on risk perception is Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Sci-
ence 280 (1987); see also Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Branden B. Johnson & Vincent T. Covello, The Social and 
Cultural Construction of Risk: Essays on Risk Selection and Perception (1987). 
119. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 
1981 (1998); Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are 
Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 706, 727–30 (1998) 
(book review essay). 
120. See Wirth & Silbergeld, Risky Reform, supra note 28, at 1878, 1884; Hearings 
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that driving at 65 m.p.h. is more dangerous than limited dioxin emis-
sions, and that we therefore should decline to regulate the dioxin, is to 
hold out the false promise that something will be done about the speed 
limit.121 If the speed limit will not be lowered, then there is no good rea-
son based on risk alone to accept the cumulative risk posed by the dioxin. 
Required risk comparison only makes sense if Congress will legislate 
and spend on the high-risk activities—like smoking—and not use it as an 
excuse to ignore the others. 
 
6. Risk assessment should be conducted through an open process 
that allows input from and understanding of the results by the entire 
range of persons and groups interested in the decision. Particular efforts 
should be made to reach persons and groups who do not have the techni-
cal expertise to use such materials easily. 
 
Risk assessment should improve regulatory decisions made in the 
broader context of a democratic society. Risk assessment can either ob-
fuscate the decisions by lending them a patina of scientific precision and 
inevitability, or it can inform a robust “social dialogue on safety.”122 The 
recent studies by the NAS and the Presidential/Congressional Commis-
sion on Risk strongly advocate the latter, envisioning an ongoing, in-
formed dialogue on risk and values among scientists, policymakers, in-
dustry, and average citizens.123
Members of the public can contribute ideas, concerns, and informa-
tion that will make risk assessments richer and more realistic. For exam-
 
                                                                                                                            
on S. 981 “Regulatory Improvement Act of 1997,” Before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong. 18 (1997) (Statement of David G. Hawkins, Senior 
Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council). Cf. Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmers-
baugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environ-
ment, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 267, 298 (1993) (“In considering opportunity costs, society should 
consider only other opportunities that it might actually implement; in short, it should 
choose among the most desirable of the feasible alternatives.”). 
121. To give another example, a NAS panel investigating radiation shielding for as-
tronauts assumed that such shielding would be of little interest to the astronauts, because 
the radiation risk of cancer was far less than the risk of lift-off. The astronauts, however, 
were quite concerned about radiation, believing that the flight risks were integral to the 
operation and limited in time, while the radiation risk was avoidable and continued long 
after the flight. National Research Council, Radiation Hazards to Crews of Interplanetary 
Missions: Biological Issues and Research Strategies (1996). 
122. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law, supra note 2, at 633 (noting sig-
nificant skepticism about the ability of most quantitative forms of risk assessment to in-
form such a dialogue.) In a similar vein, Professor Wagner has criticized the use of appar-
ently scientific methods to obscure political questions with a false sense of scientific cer-
tainty. See Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1613 (1995). 
123. See Understanding Risk, supra note 7; Presidential/Congressional Comm’n, 
supra note 8. The role of deliberative democracy in environmental decisionmaking is dis-
cussed, and the importance of an informed public emphasized, in John S. Applegate, Be-
yond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory Boards in Environmental Deci-
sionmaking, 73 Ind. L.J. 903 (1998). 
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ple, the effects of a health hazard on certain subpopulations, or the distri-
bution of risk throughout the population, may be far more apparent to lay 
citizens directly affected by the hazard than to risk assessors. Citizens 
may have a degree of familiarity with an area or an activity that regula-
tors lack and that the regulated community may hesitate to address. More 
generally, the wisdom of obtaining a “second opinion” from non-experts 
is at the heart of citizen (and judicial) review of agency action and acts as 
a hedge against the tunnel vision which can easily limit an expert 
agency’s perspective.124 Similarly, public scrutiny can be a check on the 
unconscious biases that may enter a process that relies on professional 
judgment.125
Public participation strengthens even controversial decisions by ob-
taining broader public understanding and acceptance.126 Risk assessment 
contributes to this goal when it is transparent and supports good risk 
communication.127 Here again, all assumptions, models, and extrapola-
tions should be fully explained and justified. Professional risk assess-
ment should be solicited and used—it should inform the decision—but it 
should not make decisions in a vacuum. 
 
7. Risk assessment is a tool to improve regulatory decisionmaking, 
not a tactic to delay or impede it. To avoid “paralysis by analysis,” risk 
assessments should be required only when the decision is of sufficient 
significance to warrant the effort, and the amount of effort that goes into 
the risk assessment must be reasonable in relation to the significance of 
the decision and the value of additional information. 
 
The effort of collecting and analyzing relevant data should bear 
some relation to the decision’s significance in terms of environmental or 
economic impact, difficulty, or other measure of importance. NEPA rec-
ognizes this practicality with its threshold requirement of a “major fed-
eral action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment,”128 and the regulatory planning executive orders have established a 
monetary threshold.129 An economic threshold is an imperfect but man-
 
                                                                                                                            
124. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850–53 (D.C. Cir. 
1970) (Leventhal, J.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). 
125. See Kuehn, supra note 2, at 135–36, 160–66. 
126. See generally National Research Council, Building Consensus Through Risk As-
sessment and Management of the Department of Energy’s Environmental Remediation 
Program 31–41 (1994) (recommending that agency decisions should be publicly accessi-
ble) [hereinafter Building Consensus].  
127. See id. at 24–30; Goldstein, supra note 83, at 37 (arguing that generic risk as-
sessment guidelines, combining both science and policy, should be established). 
128. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1994). 
129. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) (defining 
“significant regulatory action”); Presidential/Congressional Comm’n, supra note 8, at 154–
55. 
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ageable surrogate for the importance of a decision and for the utility of 
risk assessment in reaching it. 
Once the decision to prepare a risk assessment has been made, the 
scope of the analysis should reflect the substance of the decision and the 
alternatives before the agency. The amount of data and analysis required 
should also bear some relation to the significance of the decision. The 
NAS has warned, in its study of risk assessment mandated by the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1990: 
Risk assessment should be adjunct to the Clean Air Act’s primary 
goal of safeguarding public health, not an end in itself. A legitimate 
desire for accuracy and objectivity in representing risk can induce 
such an obsession with numbers that too much energy is expended 
on representing the results of risk assessment in precise numerical 
form. Thus, new research might be commissioned because there is 
insufficient notice of how marginal the results would be in a given 
case or without consideration of new, less resource-intensive meth-
ods of providing essential inputs. 
 
Moreover, there might be a vast difference between having “the 
truth” and having enough information to enable a risk manager to 
choose the best course of action from the options available.130
This requirement is no more than a question of cost-effectiveness: after a 
certain point, the cost of additional effort exceeds its value to the deci-
sionmaker.131 More research could always be done, but procedural re-
quirements designed to improve the regulatory process should not in ef-
fect demand more analysis and less action.132
Making the regulatory process more time-consuming and expensive 
will not solve the problem of wastefully strict regulation (if there is one). 
Moreover, elaborate and resource-intensive analytical requirements dis-
proportionately burden those who do not have ready access to the neces-
sary expertise and resources. As Robert Kuehn succinctly puts it, “with 
the tool comes power.”133
For similar reasons, external involvement in agencies’ selection of 
issues to address should be limited, though not eliminated. The petition 
process in some of the 104th Congress’s bills would have allowed out-
 
                                                                                                                            
130. Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment, supra note 7, at 260. 
131. See Toxicity Testing, supra note 31, at 207; Presidential/Congressional 
Comm’n, supra note 8, at 154–55; Building Consensus, supra note 126, at 32-33; Thomas 
O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Sci-
ence Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 Geo. L.J. 729, 736–
40 (1979). 
132. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End, supra note 19, at 1648–51. 
133. Kuehn, supra note 2, at 129 (capitalization altered). 
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side parties to petition to revise already completed risk assessments, to 
obtain judicial review of denial of such petitions, and to insist on an 
agency response within a relatively short period of time. Studies of 
OSHA and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) have 
documented how agencies subject to a mandatory petition process have 
lost focus and effectiveness.134 The right to petition agencies for action or 
reconsideration is included in the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”),135 but the ability to demand that an agency effectively drop eve-
rything and revisit a risk assessment that supported a particular rule in-
vites abuse. Again, risk-assessment requirements should not worsen the 
regulatory processes they seek to improve. 
Another potential manifestation of paralyzing detail would be a re-
quirement for separate risk assessments—and subsidiary peer review and 
judicial review—for subunits of a regulatory action. For example, OSHA 
often regulates substances, equipment, or activities that occur in several 
industries, where there may be differences in exposure patterns or other 
relevant data. Sometimes separate analyses may be needed, but the agency 
should have the freedom to determine when aggregation is proper. Judi-
cial decisions have in the past required OSHA to disaggregate its analy-
ses,136 placing a nearly insurmountable administrative burden upon the 
agency. Moreover, the subdivision of already scarce data into smaller 
units would either frustrate the ability to regulate some subunits or render 
the resulting analyses suspect as being based on too little data. The ap-
propriate unit for legislative consideration is the agency decision itself. 
Where the agency regulates too broadly, the experience with NEPA has 
shown that the judiciary will intervene.137
8. To permit effective but appropriately deferential judicial over-
sight, risk assessment issues, like other forms of regulatory analysis, 
should be reviewed after final agency action, on the whole record of that 
action. 
 
                                                                                                                            
134. See Richard A. Merrill, CPSC Regulation of Cancer Risks in Consumer Prod-
ucts: 1972-1981, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1261, 1363–64 (1981); Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting 
OSHA, supra note 31, at 15–18; Thomas R. Bartman, Note, Deciding What to Regulate: 
Priority-Setting at OSHA, 2 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 87, 108–10 (1982). 
135. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1994). 
136. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 630–
38 (1980) (plurality opinion) (disaggregating consideration of the risks posed by 100, 10, 
and 1 parts per million of benzene); AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 982 n.28 (11th Cir. 
1992) (deferring question of requiring individualized risk determinations on an industry-
by-industry basis). But see Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement 
Workers of Am., UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (accepting OSHA’s expla-
nation on remand for its decision to adopt a single standard applicable to all general indus-
try workers, rather than to disaggregate industries). 
137. CEQ requires agencies to consider together actions that have “relevant simi-
larities, such as common timing, impacts, alternatives, methods of implementation, media, 
or subject matter.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(c) (1997). The decision on whether to prepare a 
programmatic impact statement lies with the agency. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 
390 (1976); see also Envtl. Def. Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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Judicial review is another form of external interference, albeit a 
necessary one. Judicial review of the risk assessment per se would pre-
sumably involve a searching inquiry by the court into the process and 
reasoning of the agency’s risk assessors. Putting aside the limited compe-
tence of generalist judges to undertake a technical critique, the practical 
effect would be judicial overkill. As seen elsewhere in environmental 
regulation, judicial review has frequently been accused of exaggerating 
the tendency in any bureaucracy to make what is properly an analytical 
tool into an expensive and time-consuming end in itself.138 Agencies are 
already subject to reversal based on judicial dissatisfaction with the qual-
ity of the risk analysis, as occurred in Gulf South Insulation v. U.S. Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission,139 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,140 
and Leather Industries of America, Inc. v. EPA.141 Most recently, in Flue-
Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, the district court 
“vacated” several chapters of an EPA report on the risks of passive smok-
ing.142 To add to this burden by making risk assessment per se subject to 
judicial review would strain the technical capabilities of judges and give 
risk assessment an unwarranted prominence among the many elements of 
an agency decision. It would also encourage the production of “unassail-
able” risk assessments that would expend agency resources out of pro-
portion to the value of the additional information. 
Review should therefore take place, as it normally does, in the con-
text of a final agency action, at the end of the regulatory process. At that 
point, the risk analysis can be seen in its proper context, and the court 
can properly evaluate the real question before it: whether the agency, 
using the risk assessment, took a hard look at the risk issues before it. 
The adequacy of the agency’s decisionmaking process would be fully 
available for review, including the adequacy of the risk analysis, but a 
parallel track of regulatory challenges is avoided.143
IV. A Proposed Risk-assessment Model and Procedure 
Fashioning federal risk-assessment legislation poses a difficult chal-
lenge for Congress because such legislation responds to several different 
 
                                                                                                                            
138. This process often goes by the name “ossification.” See Thomas O. McGarity, 
Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1385–86 
(1992). 
139. 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983). 
140. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
141. 40 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
142. 4 F. Supp. 2d 435 (M.D.N.C. 1998). The court’s decision applied to a report 
and not a regulation; in other words, it involved direct review of a risk assessment. 
143. See infra Part IV.D for a more specific discussion of the scope and standard of 
judicial review. 
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and potentially conflicting goals. The first goal is to incorporate scien-
tific analysis into the regulatory decisionmaking process, but only as one 
tool among several which the decisionmaker should consider. Second, 
Congress should structure an agency mandate to consider risk, without 
affecting the underlying substantive provisions in each statute. A third 
goal is to formulate risk-assessment procedures without stifling devel-
opments in the field of risk assessment. Fourth, despite the insistence on 
scientific analysis, the process should handle uncertainty and gaps in risk 
assessment that can only be filled through the use of policy judgments. 
Fifth, Congress should incorporate public participation in this technically 
complex, yet value-driven, area. Sixth, to avoid paralysis, the legislation 
must place appropriate boundaries on the timing and depth of risk as-
sessments, and it must determine an appropriate scope and standard of 
judicial review. While the setting for these conflicting goals is new, Con-
gress faced the same challenges in crafting NEPA.144 Consequently, 
NEPA and its common law can serve as instructive models for federal 
risk legislation. 
President Nixon signed NEPA into law on January 1, 1970. Just as 
Congress now wishes to ensure that agencies factor risk into their deci-
sionmaking, Congress enacted section 102(2)(C) of NEPA to ensure that 
agencies consider the environmental impacts of their decisions.145 Section 
102, the primary action-forcing provision of NEPA, states: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent pos-
sible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United 
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the 
policies set forth in this Chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal 
Government shall . . . . (C) include in every recommendation or re-
port on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a de-
tailed statement by the responsible official on (i) the environmental 
impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental ef-
fects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship be-
tween local short-term uses of man’s environment and the mainte-
nance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irre-
versible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would 
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.146
These requirements led to the creation of  the EIA process . 
 
                                                                                                                            
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370d (1994); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-99 (1997). 
145. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978). 
146. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994). 
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The use of NEPA and the EIA process as a model would facilitate 
the harmonization of risk and environmental impact analyses in cases 
where both are required, as occurs with NEPA and the Endangered Spe-
cies Act.147 Therefore, this Part outlines the key elements of a potential 
Risk Impact Assessment (“RIA”) procedure based on the NEPA experi-
ence. 
A. Avoiding “Paralysis by Analysis” 
One of the concerns with risk assessment is identified in proposed 
Principle Seven:148 that risk assessment will be a tool which will impede 
or delay agency decisionmaking by requiring unreasonable allocations of 
resources to minor issues. The EIA process crudely addresses this con-
cern by identifying three classes of agency activities: 
those that may have a significant impact on the quality of the hu-
man environment [thus] requiring a environmental impact state-
ment (“EIS”); 
 
those which virtually never have a significant impact and are thereby 
categorically excluded from the EIS requirement; and, 
those where the agency does not know whether the environmental 
impact will be significant enough to require an EIS and therefore 
require an environmental assessment (“EA”) to determine whether 
an EIS is required.149
Because this division may be useful in considering a future RIA proce-
dure, it is briefly summarized below. 
In the EIA process, “actions which do not individually or cumula-
tively have a significant effect on the human environment . . . and for 
which, therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an environ-
mental impact statement is required” are categorically excluded.150 Like-
wise in a RIA process, actions that do not individually or cumulatively 
have a significant effect on human health or the environment should be 
excluded from risk-assessment requirements. 
 
                                                                                                                            
147. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(9) (1997) (defining “significantly” under NEPA for 
agency actions affecting the environment and stating that the intensity of the action should 
include the degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened 
species or its habitat that has been designated as critical under the Endangered Species Act, 
16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (1994)). See also Contra Costa, 1998 WL 164966, at *1. 
148. See infra Appendix I. 
149. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11, 1508.4, & 1508.9 (1997). 
150. Id. § 1508.4 (1997).  
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In the EIA process, when it is unclear whether an action may have a 
significant impact on the quality of the human environment, the agency 
prepares an EA. An EA (1) analyzes and provides evidence on whether to 
prepare an EIS, and may ultimately result in a (2) Finding of No Signifi-
cant Impact (“FONSI”), in which the agency must justify its decision not 
to prepare an EIS.151 The EA contains a brief discussion of the need for 
the project, reasonable alternatives to the proposal, environmental im-
pacts of the proposal and alternatives, and a listing of interested parties. 
The public must be involved in the preparation of an EA. 
Likewise, the RIA process should incorporate a tiered approach to 
deciding when a full risk assessment is required. There may be areas that 
should be categorically excluded from risk-assessment requirements and 
situations when the agency should do a preliminary investigation to de-
termine whether a full risk assessment is warranted. The NEPA system, 
which decides when to devote the full panoply of federal resources to the 
evaluation of risks and when to investigate but determine that further 
inquiry is not justifiable, provides a workable model and body of case 
law to adopt by analogy. 
Where a tiered system is used, the threshold question of when an 
EIS or risk assessment must be prepared is crucial. In the NEPA context, 
an EIS must be prepared when there is a “major federal action signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”152 This standard 
provides in-depth consideration of environmental impacts where they are 
“significant,” a term defined on a case-by-case basis depending on the 
context and intensity of the proposal.153 The term “major” reinforces 
“significant” and does not have independent meaning.154 In the search for 
criteria for determining when risk assessment is or is not required, NEPA 
would guide us to require risk assessment for rules that “may have a sig-
nificant impact on human health or the environment.” The twenty-eight 
years of case law interpreting this provision provides an instant reposi-
tory of agency and judicial insight on how to achieve the proper balance 
between requiring agencies to provide information and not overly en-
cumbering the agency process. 
B. The Public Participation Paradox 
Principle Six is designed to promote public participation in deci-
sionmaking.155 The difficulty at the heart of drafting public participation 
guidelines for risk assessment is the aura of scientific complexity that 
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surrounds the process. Yet, as shown above, value judgments infuse the 
process, affecting the risks of both present and future generations. Again, 
we can look to NEPA for guidance, for just as the process of risk assess-
ment is both scientifically complex and value-laden, so is the process of 
determining the environmental impacts of a proposed federal action. 
Over time, the common law of NEPA has created an operative system of 
experts both within and outside the agency as well as non-expert, inter-
ested parties who negotiate workable solutions though a generous public 
participation system.156
The first stage of the NEPA process is the publication of a notice of 
intent to prepare an EIS in the Federal Register, including information on 
planned meetings and the names and addresses of the agency contact 
people.157 Next, interested parties are invited to join in a scoping process 
designed to identify significant issues. During scoping, the agency identi-
fies all applicable environmental requirements, deadlines and page limits, 
the allocation of responsibilities among agencies, and the structure of and 
process for the EIS. The lead agency then prepares a draft EIS. The draft 
EIS is distributed for public and agency comment for a minimum period 
of 45 days.158 After this comment period, the lead agency must consider 
and evaluate the comments.159 This review is particularly significant be-
cause public participation requirements in other statutes do not always 
require the agency to consider or respond to public input. Under NEPA, 
however, all substantive comments received by the agency are included 
in the final EIS with the agency’s response.160 Last, the agency prepares 
the final EIS, sends it to anyone who submitted comments, and publishes 
a notice of availability in the Federal Register. The agency then waits for 
30 days from the notice of availability of the final EIS or 90 days after 
publication of the notice of availability of the draft EIS, whichever is 
later, before making its final decision on the proposal.161
The public participation requirements of the EIA process are notable 
for their extensive scoping process, which allows public participation in 
defining the issues, and in their requirement that the agency respond to 
comments. The Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk adopted 
this process because of its usefulness in the risk context.162
Although the issues in many EISs are highly complex and technical, 
the EIA process has established an iterative feedback loop that includes 
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potentially interested parties from the commencement of the project. As a 
result, a cadre of experts, both within and outside the agency and lay in-
terested parties coalesce around the project from the pre-planning stage. 
In addition, agencies must explain their processes and assumptions to lay 
audiences who express their particular normative concerns to the agency 
while these comments can still influence agency choices. Requiring 
agencies to respond to comments ensures that these normative concerns 
are at least considered. 
In the risk context, public participation at the “scoping” phase of the 
RIA, the requirement that agencies explain data and assumptions to non-
technical audiences, and the requirement that agencies consider the nor-
mative concerns of the affected parties would be valuable lessons to be 
learned from NEPA. 
C. One Tool Among Many to Make Informed Decisions 
The case law interpreting NEPA has concluded that the EIS essen-
tially serves the same function as the Guidelines envision for risk as-
sessment in Principles One and Two.163
The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that NEPA is a procedural 
statute designed to ensure that both decisionmakers and the public are 
fully informed of the environmental consequences of agency action and 
that NEPA does not dictate a substantive outcome. In 1978, the Supreme 
Court held that NEPA: 
is to ensure a fully informed and well-considered decision, not nec-
essarily a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or this Court 
would have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking 
unit of the agency.164
That decision remains strong today.165 The Court has stated that NEPA 
also “ensures that the agency will inform the public that it has indeed 
considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.”166
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have gone on to hold that the 
scope of NEPA is limited. 
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Congress . . . however, did not require agencies to elevate environ-
mental concerns over other appropriate considerations . . . . Rather, 
it required only that the agency take a “hard look” at the environ-
mental consequences before taking a major action . . . . 
 
Congress did not enact NEPA, of course, so that an agency would 
contemplate the environmental impact of an action as an abstract 
exercise. Rather, Congress intended that the “hard look” be incor-
porated as part of the agency’s process of deciding whether to pur-
sue a particular federal action.167
Likewise, the RIA process is designed to ensure that the agency 
makes an informed decision and notifies the public of its rationale. Just 
as the EIS is not the sole factor for the agency’s consideration while 
making its decision, an agency must consider many factors in making 
public health regulatory decisions. Just as with NEPA, the RIA should 
not mandate a specific result. As the Supreme Court concluded in 1989, 
NEPA “itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes 
the necessary process. If the adverse environmental effects of the pro-
posed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not 
constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the envi-
ronmental costs.”168
D. Judicial Review 
Principle Eight provides a guideline with two key elements.169 First, 
there should be effective but appropriately deferential judicial review of 
the RIA. Second, such review should take place after the final agency 
decision and be included in the administrative record. 
The RIA process should mirror the EIA process in the scope and 
standard of judicial review. The Supreme Court declared that “once an 
agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, 
the only role for a court is to ensure that the agency has considered the 
environmental consequences; it cannot ‘interject itself within the area of 
discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.’”170 
The rationale is usually that the Court does not have the authority or ex-
pertise to substitute its judgement for that of the agency.171
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The standard of judicial review under NEPA, as it should be in the 
RIA, is the “arbitrary, capricious” standard under the APA.172 As the Su-
preme Court stated: 
The role of the courts is simply to ensure that the agency has ade-
quately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its 
actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious…. Our 
only task is to determine whether the Commission has considered 
the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between 
the facts found and the choice made.173
Likewise the role of the court in reviewing the RIA process should be to 
ensure that the agency is not acting in an arbitrary or capricious manner 
and to ensure a rational connection between the risk assessment and the 
conclusions. 
This deference, however, does not mean that the court has no role to 
play in the process. The court must ensure that the risk assessment is not 
a post hoc rationalization for the agency’s predetermined conclusion. To 
do so, the court must demand an adequate administrative record174—a 
requirement that, importantly, is entirely consistent with broad public 
participation throughout the RIA process. In addition, judges can review 
the agencies’ decision whether to perform a risk assessment.175 Finally, 
courts can review whether the agency has made a reasoned or rational 
decision in light of the risk assessment and other relevant factors.176
With respect to timing, the general rule is that, in accordance with 
the administrative law doctrines of ripeness and finality, an EIS will not 
be subject to judicial review in advance of the final, substantive agency 
decision. In drafting NEPA, Congress did not create a private cause of 
action. Therefore plaintiffs must bring an action under Section 702 of the 
APA.177 Section 704 of the APA allows review only of final agency ac-
tion.178 In determining whether an agency action is final “[t]he core ques-
tion is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and 
whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the par-
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ties.”179 In virtually every challenge to an EIS, the final agency action is 
the Record of Decision. Likewise, in the RIA process, the final agency 
action would be the final rule. The timing of judicial review is analogous 
in both cases. 
The same general approach should apply to the RIA process. If any-
thing, the requirements of ripeness and finality apply with greater force 
in the RIA context. In NEPA cases, the EIS often introduces concerns 
(i.e., environmental effects) that are external to the relevant agency’s 
mandate. As a result, it is particularly important for the courts to police 
the agency’s consideration of environmental factors to ensure that the 
EIS is part of the decisionmaking process and not a post hoc rationaliza-
tion. In contrast, risk assessment is closely related to the central concerns 
of the agencies responsible for environmental, health, and safety regula-
tion, so early intervention in these agencies’ deliberations is unneces-
sary.180 In addition, an exception for early review of risk assessments 
would swallow the finality rule in environmental, health, and safety regu-
lation, since it could be invoked in virtually every situation. Finally, the 
content of risk assessments, like environmental impact assessments, is 
context-dependent.181 Therefore, abstractly reviewing adequacy places 
courts in the position of defining the issues for the agency (an inappro-
priate exercise of judicial oversight) and forces the agency to cover every 
conceivable—rather than reasonable—aspect of a given situation. 
E. Uncertainty 
Principle Four addresses the issue of scientific uncertainty in under-
taking a risk assessment.182 While the problem of lack of scientific infor-
mation seems particularly poignant in the RIA process, it also plagues 
environmental assessment. Again, NEPA regulations and common law 
provide insight on how to deal with scientific uncertainty.183
The Council on Environmental Quality’s NEPA regulations recog-
nize that the problem of uncertainty is an inevitable and recurring issue 
in predicting environmental effects. The NEPA regulations therefore deal 
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with the issue explicitly.184 If there is a feasible means to obtain informa-
tion about an environmental impact, the agency must do so unless the 
costs are exorbitant. However, if the agency finds a reasonably foresee-
able significant adverse impact for which the information is incomplete 
or unavailable, then the agency must state in the EIS what information is 
incomplete or unavailable, explain the relevance of the information, 
summarize the relevant credible scientific evidence, and evaluate the im-
pacts based upon theoretical approaches or research methods generally 
accepted in the scientific community.185
There is also language in the NEPA case law that can illuminate the 
current debate on how to handle uncertainty in the RIA. For example, the 
D.C. Circuit Court has addressed this issue: 
One of the costs that must be weighed by decisionmakers is the cost 
of uncertainty-i.e. the costs of proceeding without more and better 
information. When that cost has been considered, and where the re-
sponsible decisionmaker has decided that it is outweighed by the 
benefits of proceeding without further delay, the courts may not 
substitute their judgement for that of the decisionmaker and insist 
that the project be delayed while more information is sought.186
The Ninth Circuit agrees with the D.C. Circuit: 
Neither § 102(2)(B) or (C) can be read as a requirement that com-
plete information concerning the environmental impact of a project 
be obtained before action may be taken. If we were to impose a re-
quirement that an impact statement can never be prepared until all 
relevant environmental effects were known, it is doubtful that any 
project could ever be initiated . . . . At any point in time, there are 
likely to be any number of studies underway concerning a host of 
environmental or other societal problems. What appellants seek is 
for this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary, 
who is charged by NEPA with preparing a thorough statement of 
the environmental consequences of a proposed project, as to what 
particular information will be required to complete that statement. 
We decline to assume that role.187
In the NEPA context, the courts are deferential to the agency’s deci-
sion on how to balance the need for the proposed action with proceeding 
 
                                                                                                                            
184. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a)–(b)(1) (1997). 
185. See id. 
186. Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 473–74 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated in part by 
Western Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978) (internal citations omitted). 
187. Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1280–81 (9th Cir. 
1973) (internal citations omitted). 
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in the face of scientific uncertainty. Some degree of uncertainty will be 
an issue in virtually every scientific risk assessment in the foreseeable 
future. The NEPA case law can help guide the RIA progress. 
V. Conclusion 
There is a great deal of scholarly debate over whether NEPA has 
been successful in achieving its objectives as set out in its preamble.188 
However, there is little argument that NEPA has changed the agency de-
cisionmaking process, increased public participation in the decisionmak-
ing process, and increased accountability of the decisionmakers. These 
are precisely the objectives of the RIA. Because of its success as an in-
formational statute, NEPA provides a useful model for our present risk-
assessment debates. 
The experience with NEPA validates the pragmatic approach advo-
cated in this Article. Principally, NEPA counsels that responsible legisla-
tive requirements must be flexible enough to account for the wide variety 
of federal regulation, for the varying levels of availability and reliability 
of underlying data, and for developments in methodology. Risk assess-
ments should be carefully framed to assure that their expense and delay 
do not overwhelm the value they add to the regulatory process, and they 
must maintain an appropriate relationship between regulated entities, the 
public, courts, and agencies. These Guidelines strive to achieve that bal-
ance in risk assessment legislation. 
 
                                                                                                                            
188. See Michael C. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty: A 
Preface, 20 Envtl. L. 447 (1990); see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mim-
icry and Recruitment in Environmental Law, 20 Envtl. L. 485 (1990); Donald N. Zillman 
& Peggy Gentles, Perspectives on NEPA in the Courts, 20 Envtl. L. 505 (1990); Nicholas 
C. Yost, NEPA’s Promise—Partially Fulfilled, 20 Envtl. L. 533 (1990); David C. Shilton, Is 
the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Explanations for a 12-0 Record, 20 
Envtl. L. 551 (1990); Thomas O. McGarity, Judicial Enforcement of NEPA-Inspired Prom-
ises, 20 Envtl. L. 569 (1990). 
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Appendix I: The Draft Guidelines 
Any formal requirement that Federal Government agencies under-
take formal risk assessments in advance of regulatory action should con-
form to the following principles: 
 
1. Risk assessment considers an important and useful but not com-
prehensive set of information relevant to regulatory decisions. 
 
2. The purpose of risk assessment is to gather, analyze, organize, 
and present relevant information; it should not itself be an argument for 
or dictate a particular substantive outcome. 
 
3. Risk-assessment requirements must allow for flexibility to ac-
count for a variety of applications of the tool—safety as well as health, 
acute risks as well as chronic ones—and for developments in methodol-
ogy and scientific knowledge. Risk assessors should exercise their pro-
fessional judgments but be subject to the requirements of identifying and 
explaining their judgments. Peer review should be limited to discrete is-
sues upon which there is considerable disagreement, uncertainty, or other 
difficulty. 
 
4. Risk assessments must explicitly acknowledge and explain the 
limitations of the process in terms of methodology, data, assumptions, 
uncertainty, variability, and qualitative characteristics of risk. Thus, 
agencies should use qualitative risk assessments when uncertainty or the 
qualitative aspects of risk predominate. Direct evidence of risks should 
be used when it is available and reliable; otherwise, it is appropriate to 
use standardized, protective “default” assumptions. 
 
5. Risk comparisons can be helpful for placing risks in context for 
standard setting or priority setting, but the comparisons should be ap-
proached with great caution and comparison of unlike risks should be 
avoided. 
 
6. Risk assessment should be conducted through an open process 
that allows input from and understanding of the results by the entire 
range of persons and groups interested in the decision. Particular efforts 
should be made to reach persons and groups who do not have the techni-
cal expertise to use such materials easily. 
 
7. Risk assessment is a tool to improve regulatory decisionmaking, 
not a tactic to delay or impede it. To avoid “paralysis by analysis,” risk 
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assessments should be required only when the decision is of sufficient 
significance to warrant the effort, and the amount of effort that goes into 
the risk assessment must be reasonable in relation to the significance of 
the decision and the value of additional information. 
 
8. To permit effective but appropriately deferential judicial over-
sight, risk assessment issues, like other forms of regulatory analysis, 
should be reviewed after final agency action, on the whole record of that 
action. 
Appendix II: Comparison of Risk Reform Proposals 
The following chart is a summary of several risk reform bills, each 
of which differs in important details from the others. While this chart is a 
helpful way to convey broad differences in approach, it inevitably misses 
subtleties in specific bills. Readers who wish to evaluate particular pieces 
of legislation, therefore, should not rely solely on the characterization 
here but should consult the original. 
“Aggressive Risk Reform” includes the legislation cited above in 
the 104th Congress, including the Contract with America bills and H.R. 
1834189 (affecting OSHA).190 “Congressional Compromise” reflects pri-
marily the Levin-Thompson bill in the 105th Congress, to a lesser extent 
the revision of the Safe Drinking Water Act, but not Senator Thompson’s 
S. 2161. The last column, Entitled “Risk Principles,” reflects this Arti-
cle’s Draft Guidelines. 
 
                                                                                                                            
189. H.R. 1834, 104th Cong., (1995) (June 14, 1995 version). Much of the bill was 
drafted by lobbyists for subject industries. David Maraniss & Michael Weisskopf, Tell 
Newt to Shut Up! 61 (1996). 
190. For a detailed critique of this legislation, see McGarity & Shapiro, OSHA’s 
Critics and Regulatory Reform, supra note 4. 
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Elements Aggressive 
Risk Reform 
Congres-
sional 
Compromise 
Risk 
Principles 
Substantive Provisions 
“Supermandate”: requires all safety, 
health, and environmental rules to be 
cost-justified (i.e., that calculated 
benefits outweigh calculated costs) 
X  X 
Judicial review of risk assessment per se part of record none 
Risk Assessment Procedures 
Requires quantification of risks and 
benefits, or devalues unquantified risks 
X ?  
Requires explanation of assumptions 
and uncertainties 
X X191 X 
Requires analysis of risk distribution 
in population192
 X X 
Analysis of “substitution risk” (i.e., 
the risks of the intervention itself)193
X X  
Requires risk analyses of alternative 
regulatory actions 
X X194 X 
Prescribes Red Book formulation for 
conducting risk assessments 
X   
Requires assessment of non-human 
environmental risk 
  X 
Data collection and analysis tied to 
the importance of decision and the 
need for information 
 ?195 X 
Requires agency seriously consider 
data proffered by interest groups 
X196   
Broad public participation in risk 
assessment process 
 X197 X 
Peer review X X X 
Petition process and look-back at 
existing rules 
X X198  
Risk Expression and Communication 
Response to “significant” comments 
required 
X X  
Comparisons with “familiar” risks 
required 
X X199 X 
Risks to be expressed as ranges; 
upper-bound (worst-case) risks not 
permitted standing alone 
X X  
Requires “best estimates,” “realistic 
assumptions,” “central” estimates 
X   
Regulatory Analysis and Oversight 
“Major rule” threshold for require-
ment  
Low (varies) high ($100 mil-
lion) 
high ($100 
million) 
Requires risk-based priority setting X (X)200 X201
Intensive OMB oversight and coor-
dination of risk assessment process 
 X 202 X 
Control of ex parte communications 
with OMB 
 X203 X 
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191. This requirement clearly applies to assumptions and uncertainties specific to a 
particular decision, but it is less clear whether generic assumptions that serve as starting 
points (for example, the validity of extrapolating the results of animal testing to humans) 
would need to be justified in detail for every decision. 
192. Risk distribution analyses within populations are important from an environ-
mental justice point of view. However, such analyses also require large amounts of data 
that frequently do not exist or would be expensive to assemble. 
193. The idea of substitution risks is detailed in Graham & Wiener, supra note 35 at 
22–25. In all of the bills, it is not clear whether substitution risks must be analyzed in the 
same detail as the principal risk being addressed.  
194. See id. 
195. S. 981, 105th Cong. (1995), is unclear on this element. On the one hand, it says 
that the level of analysis should correspond to the seriousness of the risk and speaks of 
“reasonably available” information; on the other hand, it requires a “succinct” executive 
summary, § 623(e), which implies a sizable back-up document. 
196. Older bills basically required the agency to take industry- or interest group–
generated data into account. S. 981, 105th Cong. § 624(b) (1995) (“reliable and reasonably 
available scientific information”). 
197. Public participation requirements are limited to state, local, and tribal govern-
ments; there is no mention of stakeholders generally. 
198. S. 981, 105th Cong. (1997), allows the agency to accommodate such processes 
on its own schedule. Previous bills required agencies to respond to petitions to reexamine 
risk assessments within a short period of time. See S. 333, 104th Cong. § 5(b)(3) (1995); 
H.R. 9, 104th Cong. § 3401(a) (1995); see also H.R. 9, 104th Cong. § 3401(b) (1995) 
(providing for judicial review of denials of petitions). 
199. A “familiar” risk is not necessarily a similar one. 
200. The 105th Congress required a study to assess this option.  
201. Risk is one consideration; others are also permitted. Cf. Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) at §1(b)(4) (providing for judicial review of denials of 
petitions).  
202. This element confirms the coordinating role of OMB as framed by the execu-
tive orders of the last two decades. The interaction between the Council of Economic Ad-
visors and health agencies can be delicate, since these groups may not value the same out-
comes or support the same goals.  
203. The Office of Management and Budget section of the statute is a replay of 
various failed Congressional efforts to rein in Exec. Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 
(1981); Exec. Order 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985); and Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 51,735 (1993) (concerning regulatory planning and review). See Pildes & Sunstein, 
supra note 19, at 15–24 & n.70. 
